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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Constitutional Law-Cruel and Unusual Punishments--Eighth
Amendment Prohibits Excessively Long Sentences.-Appellant Downey
was convicted by a jury in an Ohio county court of two crimes: possession of
marijuana for sale, and sale of marijuana. This was Downey's first drug-
related offense, and the amount of marijuana involved was "very small."
Nevertheless, he was sentenced to two consecutive indeterminate sentences
according to the Ohio statute' and received a total sentence of thirty to sixty
years imprisonment for the two offenses. On appeal, Downey contended that
the length of his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the constitutions of the United States 2 and of Ohio. 3 The Ohio
Court of Appeals rejected this contention and affirmed both conviction and
sentence. A motion by Downey for review by the Supreme Court of Ohio was
denied, and Downey then petitioned the federal district court for a writ of
habeas corpus. When the writ was denied, Downey appealed. The Sixth
Circuit reversed the decision of the district court, and found that "the
sentence imposed on Downey, in response to the requirements of the Ohio
statute, was excessive in length and disproportionate to the nature of the
offenses for which he was convicted."'4 The cause was remanded, with
instructions that the writ of habeas corpus be issued. Downey v. Perini, 518
F.2d 1288 (6th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 44 U.S.L.W. 3330 (U.S. Dec. 2,
1975).
The issue facing the Sixth Circuit was whether a thirty to sixty year
sentence for a first narcotics-related conviction of possession for sale and sale
of a "small amount" of marijuana constituted cruel and unusual punishment. s
More broadly, the court considered whether the length of a sentence might be
the sole basis for a finding of cruel and unusual punishment.
1. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 3719.99(D), (F) (Anderson 1971).
2. U.S. Const. amend. VIIL "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." This prohibition has been made applica-
ble to the states through the 14th amendment. See note 5 infra.
3. Ohio Const. art. I, § 9.
4. Downey v. Perini, 518 F.2d 1288, 1292 (6th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 44 U.S.L.W.
3330 (U.S. Dec. 2, 1975). The Supreme Court remanded the case for reconsideration in light of
statutory amendments in Ohio affecting the gravity of the crime of possessing and trafficking in
various amounts of controlled substances, including marijuana, and the punishments to be
imposed for such crimes. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2925.03 (1975 Legis. Bull. No. 4, at 261)
(Page). The Court's disposition of the case does not appear to affect the validity of the 6th
Circuit's analysis of the problem of cruel and unusual punishment.
5. Since Downey contended that both the state statute and the sentence imposed under it
violated the United States Constitution as well as that of Ohio, it should be noted that the eighth
amendment has been incorporated into state law through the fourteenth amendment. Though the
issue of incorporation was not always clear, see In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 449 (1890) (no
incorporation); O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 331-32 (1892) (same; dictum); Louisiana ex rel.
Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) (incorporation accepted, dictum), the issue was settled
in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
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The authors of the eighth amendment probably were concerned primarily
with the prevention of barbaric forms of punishment, and therefore addressed
themselves principally to the issue of mode of punishment. 6 During the first
one hundred years after ratification of the eighth amendment, the question of
excessiveness of punishment, as opposed to modality, did not arise before the
Supreme Court in eighth amendment cases. Even when the question did come
up, in O'Neil v. Vermont, 7 the majority failed to reach the issue of excessively
long punishment.8 In a vigorous dissent, however, Mr. Justice Field con-
tended that the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments should be
directed to "all punishments which by their excessive length or severity are
greatly disproportioned to the offences charged."9 Less than twenty years later
the Court faced this question squarely in Weems v. United States, 1o when it
accepted the principle enunciated by Mr. Justice Field: the Constitution
prohibits excessiveness of punishment as well as barbaric forms of punish-
ment, and the length of punishment must be proportioned to the offense."I
The majority declared that although the main purpose of the eighth amend-
ment prohibition probably was to prevent physical cruelty, the drafters also
must have been aware of the possibility of more subtle cruelty.' 2 In any
event, the court continued, "a principle to be vital must be capable of wider
application than the mischief which gave it birth.'1 3
Courts dealing with cases challenging individual sentences or the constitu-
tionality of sentencing statutes have been reluctant to expand on the tradi-
tional interpretation of the eighth amendment,' 4 although Weems gave them
6. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57
Calif. L. Rev. 839, 860-65 (1969), cited in Downey v. Perini, 518 F.2d 1288, 1290 n.1 (6th CIr.),
vacated and remanded, 44 U.S.L.W. 3330 (U.S. Dec. 2, 1975); Note, The Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause and the Substantive Criminal Law, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 635, 636-37 (1966). But
see Comment, The Eighth Amendment, Beccaria, and the Enlightenment: An Historical Jus-
tification for the Weems v. United States Excessive Punishment Doctrine, 24 Buffalo L. Rev.
783, 806-30 (1975).
7. 144 U.S. 323 (1892).
8. In O'Neil, the plaintiff had been found guilty of 307 violations of a state statute requiring a
license to sell intoxicating liquor. Under the statute, he was sentenced separately for each distinct
sale. The court dismissed the appeal, holding that no federal question was involved, since at the
time, the eighth amendment was not considered to be applicable to the states, see note 5 supra,
and all the sales took place within Vermont. Id. at 334-37.
9. Id. at 339-40 (Field, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
10. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). The Weems case involved the conviction of a minor government
officer who falsified an official document. He was sentenced to fifteen years at hard labor,
constant wearing of shackles, loss of civil liberties, and surveillance for life.
11. See id. at 367, where it is suggested that it is a "precept of justice that punishment for
crime should be graduated and proportioned to the offense."
12. Id. at 373.
13. Id. Interpreting Weems almost fifty years later, Mr. Chief Justice Warren said, "the
words of the Amendment are not precise, and ... their scope is not static. The Amendment must
draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (footnote omitted).
14. E.g., United States v. Fiore, 467 F.2d 86, 89 n.9 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
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the authority to do so. By distinguishing Ween on its facts,' s or by giving
wide deference to legislative determinations as to what constitutes appropriate
punishment, 16 courts have avoided attempts to identify the elements which
constitute disproportionality between crime and sentence.
Recently, however, several states have attempted to examine sentences in
the context of the Weems interpretation of cruel and unusual punishment by
setting up criteria against which imprisonment terms may be measured.' 7
984 (1973) (20 years without parole for sale of heroin not cruel and unusual); United States v.
Avey, 428 F.2d 1159, 1164 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 903 (1970) (S years mandatory
imprisonment for concealing marijuana held not cruel and unusual); United States v. Del Tom,
426 F.2d 181, 184 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 829 (1970) (mandatory five year sentence
for first offender convicted of sale of heroin held not cruel and unusual); see Downey v. Perini,
518 F.2d 1288 (6th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 44 U.S.L.W. 3330 (U.S. Dec. 2. 1975); Note,
The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the Substantive Criminal Law, 79 Harv. L. Rev.
635, 640 (1966); Note, The Effectiveness of the Eighth Amendment; An Appraisal of Cruel and
Unusual Punishment, 36 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 846, 848-49 (1961); Comment, Marijuana and the Law:
The Constitutional Challenges to Mvarijuana Laws in Light of the Social Aspects of Marijuana
Use, 13 Vll. L. Rev. 851, 869 (1968).
In order to sustain an attack on a sentence as violative of the eighth amendment, the defendant
generally must show that the statute itself is unconstitutional because the penalties provided are
cruel and unusual. Ordinarily, any sentence of imprisonment which is within the limits of a valid
statute is not considered cruel and unusual. See, e.g., Downey v. Perini, supra; United States v.
Hatcher, 473 F.2d 321 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Wallace, 269 F.2d 394 (3d Cir. 1959);
Black v. United States, 269 F.2d 38 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 938 (1960); United
States v. Maiden, 355 F. Supp. 743 (D. Conn. 1973).
15. E.g., where a defendant was convicted of leaving the state to avoid giving testimony, and
sentenced under state statute to five years imprisonment, the Sixth Circuit stated, "We need not
pause long to reject the invalid argument of appellant that the federal statute which he violated
inflicts cruel and unusual punishment in contravention of the Eighth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States. Historically viewed, the Eighth Amendment was adopted to
prevent inhuman, barbarous, or torturous punishment, though long-term imprisonment could be
so disproportionate to the offense as to fall within the inhibition. We think it clear that the
statutory provision for a maximum term of five years' imprisonment for fleeing a state to avoid
giving testimony in a felony case, and thus obstructing justice, cannot reasonably be classified as
cruel and unusual punishment within a constitutional or any other sense." Hemans v. United
States, 163 F.2d 228, 237-38 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 801 (1947); zee Kasper v.
Brittain, 245 F.2d 92, 96 (6th Cir. 1957); United States ex rel. Darrah v. Brierley, 290 F. Supp.
960, 964 (E.D. Pa. 1968), afl'd, 415 F.2d 9 (3d Cir. 1969).
16. "The fixing of penalties for crimes is a legislative function. What constitutes an adequate
penalty is a matter of legislative judgment and discretion, and the courts will not interfere
therewith unless the penalty prescribed is clearly and manifestly cruel and unusual.
"Where the sentence imposed is within the limits prescribed by the statute for the offense
committed, it ordinarily will not be regarded as cruel and unusual." Schultz v. Zerbst, 73 F.2d
668, 670 (10th Cir. 1934) (footnote omitted); Sansone v. Zerbst, 73 F.2d 670, 672 (10th Cir. 1934);
see Crutchfield v. Commonwealth, 248 Ky. 704, 59 S.W.2d 983, 985 (1933); People v.
Morehouse, 80 Misc. 2d 406, 364 N.Y.S.2d 108 (Sup. Ct. 1975); Note, The Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause and the Substantive Criminal Law, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 635, 640 (1966).
17. Note, Drug Abuse, Law Abuse, and the Eighth Amendment: New York's 1973 Drug
Legislation and the Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 60 Cornell L. Rev. 638,
646 n.44 (1975).
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In People v. Lorentzen, 8 an influential decision,1 9 the Michigan Supreme
Court made a careful examination of the Weems principle as it applied
to the length of a sentence, and found that the sentence at issue was ex-
cessive. 20 In Lorentzen, a twenty-three year old defendant with no prior
record was convicted of selling marijuana and, under the Michigan statute
mandating a minimum of twenty years imprisonment, was sentenced to
twenty to twenty-one years imprisonment. The Michigan court applied a
three-tiered test to determine whether this sentence violated the constitutional
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 21 First, the court at-
tempted to analyze the proportionality of the sentence. It compared the
statutory penalty for sale of marijuana with "other Michigan statutes dealing
with offenses involving the sale of various substances, or with offenses against
persons or property. ,,,22 and concluded that these other statutes mandated
significantly shorter minimum sentences than did the marijuana law. 23 The
court also noted that within a month, the new statutory maximum penalty for
the sale of marijuana in Michigan would be four years. 24 The court thus
determined that the mandatory minimum sentence of twenty years failed to
meet the test of proportionality. 25
Secondly, the court, citing Trop v. Dulles, 26 measured the sentence against
the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society. ' 27 The court did this by looking
to comparative law for guidelines in determining what penalties are widely regarded as
proper for the offense in question.
An examination of the statutes of other states dealing with the sale of marijuana
reveals that 26 states have no minimum sentence for the sale of marijuana; 3
provide a 2-year minimum; 9 have a 1-year minimum; 9 provide a 5-year mandatory
minimum; and 1 provides a mandatory minimum of 10 years. Only one state, Ohio,
has as severe a minimum sentence for the sale of marijuana as Michigan.2 8
18. 387 Mich. 167, 194 N.W.2d 827 (1972).
19. Lorentzen has been cited in, e.g., United States v. Maiden, 355 F. Supp. 743, 749 (D.
Conn. 1973) (distinguished); In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972);
People v. Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d 100, 332 N.E.2d 338, 371 N.Y.S.2d 471 (1975); People v. McNalr,
46 App. Div. 2d 476, 363 N.Y.S.2d 151 (4th Dep't 1975).
20. 387 Mich. at 181, 194 N.W.2d at 834.
21. Id. at 173-79, 194 N.W.2d at 829-33.
22. Id. at 178, 194 N.W.2d at 832.
23. For example, the court noted that the maximum penalty for adulterating food was ninety
days; for sale of explosives, five years; and for placing pins, needles, razor blades, glass or other
harmful objects in food, ten years. Further, the maximum statutory penalties for crimes involving
harm to people, such as manslaughter, was fifteen years, and carrying a firearm with unlawful
intent, five years. Id. at 176-77, 194 N.W.2d at 831.
24. Id. at 178, 194 N.W.2d at 832.
25. Id.
26. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
27. Id. at 101. See note 13 supra.
28. 387 Mich. at 179, 194 N.W.2d at 832. The Downey opinion, decided three years after
Lorentzen, stated that Ohio's mandatory minimum sentences for sale of marijuana and possession
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The court concluded that the Michigan statute did not meet the "evolving
standards of decency" test.
The third tier of the test applied by the Michigan court involved the
question of the purposes of imprisonment, and, specifically, whether any valid
goals sought to be achieved by imposition of a prison sentence would be
furthered by an affirmation of this sentence on this defendant for this crime.
The court noted that although deterrence, protection of society, and rehabili-
tation of the criminal are valid goals of imprisonment, in the instant case, it
was "dubious, to say the least, that now 26-year old Eric Lorentzen will be a
better member of society after serving a prison sentence of at least 10 years, 7
months and 6 days."' 2 9 The court vacated the sentence and remanded the case
to the trial court for resentencing; significantly, it did not go so far as to set
aside the statute as unconstitutional. 30 In separate opinions, however, two
justices indicated that they would have held the statute to be violative of the
eighth amendment. 3 1
Shortly after the Lorentzen decision, a series of California opinions
32
adopted the Weems principle of proportionality. Further refining the Weems
standard, these decisions required that a sentence be examined according to
clearly defined criteria. In the first of the California cases, In re Lynch, 3 3 the
state supreme court held that a sentence of "not less than one year ' "4 was so
disproportionate to the crime-a second conviction for indecent exposure-
that the sentence violated the prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
ment.35 The court recognized the function of the legislature to "define crimes
and prescribe punishments," but warned that "legislative authority remains
ultimately circumscribed by the constitutional provision forbidding the inflic-
tion of cruel or unusual punishment... ,"36 the final determination of which
for sale were the highest in the country. Downey v. Perini, 518 F.2d 1288, 1291 (6th Cir.),
vacated and remanded, 44 U.S.L.W. 3330 (U.S. Dec. 2, 1975).
29. 387 Mich. at 181, 194 N.W.2d at 833 (the minimum sentence if defendant earned full
credit for "good time').
30. Id. at 182-83, 194 N.W.2d at 834. This court, then, did not follow the general rule that a
sentence within the limits of a valid statute cannot be set aside without striking down the statute
itself. See note 14 supra.
31. 387 Mich. at 182, 194 N.W.2d at 834 (Kavanagh, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part); id. at 182-83, 194 N.W.2d at 834 (Williams, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
32. In re Adams, - Cal. 3d - , - , 536 P.2d 473, 478-79, 122 Cal. Rptr. 73, 78-79
(1975); In re Foss, 10 Cal. 3d 910, 519 P.2d 1073, 112 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1974); In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d
410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972); People v. Wilson, - Cal. App. 3d -, 123 Cal.
Rptr. 663 (1st Dist. 1975); People v. Ruiz, - Cal. App. 3d -, 122 Cal. Rptr. 841, 845-47
(1st Dist. 1975); People v. Thomas, 45 Cal. App. 3d 749, 119 Cal. Rptr. 739 (1st Dist. 1975).
33. 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972).
34. For the purpose of testing the constitutionality of the sentence at issue in the case, the
court considered the sentence to be the equivalent of one of life imprisonment. The court pointed
out that Cal. Penal Code § 671 (West 1970) confirmed that such sentences are life sentences. 8
Cal. 3d at 419, 503 P.2d at 927, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 223.
35. 8 Cal. 3d at 419, 503 P.2d at 927, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 223.
36. Id. at 414, 503 P.2d at 923, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
1975]
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lies with the judiciary.37 The court in Lynch examined the issue of dispropor-
tionality first by comparing length of sentence to the seriousness of the
offense38 and the character of the offender. 39 Secondly, the court compared
the challenged sentence with punishments imposed within the same jurisdic-
tion for more serious offenses. 40 Finally the court compared the challenged
penalty with penalties for the same offense in other jurisdictions. 4 1
There is a similarity between the Michigan and California tests. Both
require comparison of the sentence at issue with statutory provisions for the
same offense in other states, 42 and against the statutory punishments for more
serious crimes in their own state. 43 The California test considers the danger to
society created by the offense at issue. The Michigan test is broader; it
attempts to determine whether any of the valid goals sought to be achieved by
imposition of a term of imprisonment is served by the sentence imposed. 4 4
In a recent New York Court of Appeals case, People v. Broadie,45 the court
applied a test not dissimilar to those in Michigan and California. In Broadie,
appellants 46 claimed that the sentences were grossly disproportionate to the
crime and for that reason alone constituted cruel and unusual punishment.
The court, by Chief Judge Breitel, looked first at the gravity of the offense,
especially the harm it causes society. 47 In referring to the widespread
37. Id.
38. Id. at 425, 429-37, 503 P.2d at 930, 933-39, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 226, 229-35.
39. Id. at 425, 437-39, 503 P.2d at 930, 939-40, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 226, 235-36.
40. Id. at 426, 503 P.2d at 931-32, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 227.
41. Id. at 427, 503 P.2d at 932, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 228. This three-tiered test for determining
whether a sentence is disproportionate was used in another important decision, In re Foss, 10
Cal. 3d 910, 519 P.2d 1073, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1974). In that case, petitioner had been convicted
under a statute relating to narcotics other than marijuana. Under the provisions of the statute, lie
was to be denied consideration for parole for ten years because he had a prior drug conviction.
The statute made no provision for determining the existence of mitigating circumstances.
Applying the Lynch test to determine if any disproportionality existed, the court concluded that
petitioner had been subjected to cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 929, 519 P.2d at 1085, 112
Cal. Rptr. at 661. This finding contrasts vividly with a California Court of Appeals holding nine
years earlier. In People v. Marsden, 234 Cal. App. 2d 796, 44 Cal. Rptr. 728 (2d Dist. 1965), a
defendant with no prior drug involvement was sentenced to imprisonment for five years to life,
with no possibility of parole for three years. The crime occurred when defendant gave one
marijuana cigarette to an undercover police officer who previously had repeatedly and unsuccess-
fully tried to make a marijuana purchase from him. The court upheld the sentence on appeal,
despite the existence of the element of entrapment. The court said that "[tlhe penalty, as against
the background of this particular case, may seem harsh; but the Legislature necessarily deals with
criminal activity by classes and not by cases . . . ." Id. at 798, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
42. See text accompanying notes 28 supra & 50 infra.
43. See text accompanying notes 23 supra & 50 infra.
44. See text accompanying notes 29 supra & 50 infra.
45. 37 N.Y.2d 100, 332 N.E.2d 338, 371 N.Y.S.2d 471 (1975).
46. The case involved appeals by eight defendants convicted in unrelated trials. The court
determined that "[tihe principal issue [in all of the appeals] is whether the so-called 'drug' laws, in
mandating life imprisonment and, therefore, lifetime parole on parole release, prescribe sentences
so disproportionate as would constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of constitu-
tional limitations .... ." Id. at 110, 332 N.E.2d at 341, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 474.
47. Id. at 112, 332 N.E.2d at 342-43, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 476-77.
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phenomenon of drug trafficking, especially in New York, and the collateral
effect of drug-related criminal activity on other crimes, the court considered
the crime a "grave offense of high rank.148 Secondly, the court evaluated the
"character of the offender and the gravity of the threat he poses to society. " 49
Noting that these defendants, though not all hardened criminals, each played
a role in the distribution of drugs, the court concluded it would not be
unreasonable for the legislature to consider such defendants a serious threat to
society. Thirdly, Judge Breitel examined the validity of the legislative pur-
poses in creating a system of admittedly severe punishments. He concluded
that the legislature could reasonably decide that isolation of the criminal and
deterrence of drug abuse-valid goals not achieved under prior law-are
furthered by harsh sentences. Finally, the court stated that the sentences must
be measured against punishments for other crimes in this state, and punish-
ment for similar crimes in other states. s ° Conceding that New York has the
harshest drug laws in the country, the court nevertheless noted that the
problem of drug abuse in New York is more severe than elsewhere;5 for that
reason, as well as for reasons of the seriousness of the crime itself, he
concluded that the laws were not irrationally severe.5 2 In noting that the
legislature is entitled to wide latitude in determining the extent of punishment
for criminal acts, the court stated:
That courts may believe that the Legislature is mistaken, does not lessen the legislative
power ...
In so holding, in the exercise of judicial restraint and with respect for the separation
of powers, the court does not necessarily approve or concur in the Legislature's
judgment in adopting these sanctions .... Given the present state of criminological
knowledge, perhaps only time will tell whether the course pursued will prove effective
or will fail as every similar effort since the Harrison Act of 1914 has failed."3
Thus it appears that as a practical matter, a term of imprisonment under the
drug trafficking laws in New York is not likely to be overturned as dispropor-
tionate. However, the reasoning of the New York Court of Appeals indicates
that New York has adopted standards for measuring sentences similar to
those already discussed. On the broad question of whether a sentence may be
48. Id. at 113, 332 N.E.2d at 343, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 477.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 115, 332 N.E.2d at 344, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 479.
51. The court indicated that California, with a drug problem almost as serious as that in New
York, punishes drug trafficking almost as severely as New York does. Id. at 116, 332 N.E.2d at
345, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 480.
52. Id. at 117, 332 N.E.2d at 345, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 481.
53. Id. at 117-18, 332 N.E.2d at 346, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 481-82. A similar statement is made in
People v. McNair, 46 App. Div. 2d 476, 363 N.Y.S.2d 151 (4th Dep't 1975). That court stated,
"[Mt is still too soon to know for certain whether this statute will have the desired effect of helping
in the solution of the drug problem in New York. More time needs to pass before that answer
emerges. Subject to the test of such time, however, we conclude ... that Chapters 276-278 of the
Laws of 1973 meet the standards by which a statute, challenged as inflicting cruel and unusual
punishment, is to be judged and that appellants have failed to prove this law unconstitutional
beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 482, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 158.
1975]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
violative of the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment solely
because of its length, New York has answered affirmatively.5 4
In Downey, the Sixth Circuit disposed of the question very clearly, stating
that "a sentence which is disproportionate to the crime for which it is
administered may be held to violate the Eighth Amendment solely because of
the length of imprisonment imposed."55 The court acknowledged that the
Supreme Court has never found a sentence of imprisonment to constitute
cruel and unusual punishment solely because of its length,5 6 and that some
circuits have held explicitly that such a finding is not possible. 57 Nevertheless,
it cited two cases as a basis for its holding. In Howard v. Fleming, 8 the
Supreme Court heard an eighth amendment challenge based on length of
sentence alone. Although it found the sentence valid, the fact that the Court
heard the challenge on the merits appeared to the Sixth Circuit to be a strong
argument that the Court accepted the theory that a sentence could be
overturned solely on the basis of length. 59 In Hemans v. United States,60 the
Sixth Circuit had stated, in dismissing appellant's eighth amendment argu-
ment, that "long-term imprisonment could be so disproportionate to the
offense as to fall within the inhibition."'61 Downey was the first United States
Court of Appeals decision to base its holdings unequivocally on such a theory.
Downey also involved the narrower question of whether a thirty to sixty
year sentence of imprisonment for possession for sale and sale of a small
amount of marijuana was so disproportionate to the offense as to offend the
eighth amendment. This question did not involve a challenge to the right of
the legislature to regulate conduct involving marijuana; rather the question,
based on the standard enunciated in Weems, was this: considering the relative
harmlessness of marijuana, was the length of the sentence of imprisonment so
disproportionate to the crime as to be not logically related to it?62
Until Downey, courts have "consistently dismissed such challenges out of
54. 37 N.Y.2d at 111, 332 N.E.2d at 341, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 475.
55. Downey v. Perini, 518 F.2d 1288, 1290 (6th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 44 U.S.L.W.
3330 (U.S. Dec. 2, 1975).
56. Id.
57. Id. The court cited Rener v. Beto, 447 F.2d 20, 23 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 1051 (1972) (thirty year sentence for second offense of marijuana possession did not
constitute cruel and unusual punishment); Anthony v. United States, 331 F.2d 687, 693-94 (9th
Cir. 1964) (consecutive sentences totaling forty years imprisonment and fine for two sales of
marijuana were not excessive and did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment); Smith v.
United States, 273 F.2d 462, 467-68 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 846 (1960) (fourteen
consecutive sentences totaling fifty-two years for offenses involving possession and sale of
marijuana and heroin did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment although the sentence was
excessive under the circumstances).
58. 191 U.S. 126 (1903).
59. Downey v. Perini, 518 F.2d 1288, 1290 (6th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 44 U.S.L.W.
3330 (U.S. Dec. 2, 1975).
60. 163 F.2d 228 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 801 (1947).
61. Id. at 237.
62. See generally Downey v. Perini, 518 F.2d 1288, 1289-90 (6th Cir.), vacated and
remanded, 44 U.S.L.W. 3330 (U.S. Dec. 2, 1975).
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hand, refusing to look at any empirical evidence as to the relative harmless-
ness of marijuana, and generally without giving any substance to the constitu-
tional prohibition against 'excessive' penalties.163
Although a few courts have shown concern with the harshness of the
penalties for marijuana offenses, 64 it was not until the Lorentzen decision that
a comprehensive examination of the specific problem was made and a
marijuana sentence was overturned as cruel and unusual. 65 In a recent
California case, 66 a sentence imposed upon a defendant for possession of
marijuana was revoked, and the underlying statute found unconstitutional
because it did not provide for eligibility for parole until five years after
sentencing. The court found that since the statute precluded parole " 'without
regard to the existence of . . . possible mitigating circumstances' ,67 it was
violative of the cruel and unusual punishment prohibition. 68 The court
reached this conclusion by applying the standards enunciated in Lynch. 69
In overturning as cruel and unusual a sentence of imprisonment for a
marijuana offense, the federal circuit court in Downey applied the criteria
that are common to both the Michigan and California tests; specifically the
court compared the statutory penalty at issue with those in other jurisdictions
for the same offense, and with penalties for other, more serious crimes in the
same jurisdiction.7 0 The court's survey of the minimum penalties imposed in
other states revealed that Ohio had the most severe punishment, its minimum
penalty for the offense far exceeding the minimums in other states.7 1 Similar-
ly, the examination of Ohio's penalties for other crimes showed that at the
time of the Downey decision, the penalties for the crimes at issue "far exceed
those provided for other offenses, including crimes involving violence.""7
63. Soler, Of Cannabis and the Courts: A Critical Examination of Constitutional Challenges
to statutory Marijuana Prohibitions, 6 Conn. L. Rev. 601, 686-87 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Soler]. See text accompanying footnotes 14-16, where it is suggested that this approach is not
limited to marijuana challenges. See also People v. Morehouse, 80 Misc. 2d 406, 364 N.Y.S.2d
108 (Sup. CL 1975) (cruel and unusual punishment challenge to marijuana sentence rejected
summarily; court showed great deference to the legislature).
64. E.g., People v. Gonzales, 25 Ill. 2d 235, 184 N.E.2d 833 (1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S.
923 (1963) (court commented that penalty was severe for a first marijuana offense); cf. United
States v. Kleinzahler, 306 F. Supp. 311 (E.D.N.Y. 1969) (court noted that marijuana penalties
are unique and severe).
65. Soler, supra note 63, at 690.
66. People v. Ruiz, - Cal. App. 3d - , 122 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1st DisL 1975).
67. Id. at - , 122 Cal. Rptr. at 846, quoting In re Foss, 10 Cal. 3d 910. 929, 519 P.2d
1073, 1085, 112 CaL Rptr. 649, 661 (1974).
68. The court relied on In re Foss, 10 Cal. 3d 910, 519 P.2d 1073. 112 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1974);
In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972).
69. See text accompanying notes 33-41, and note 41 supra.
70. 518 F.2d at 1291-92.
71. Id. at 1291.
72. Id. at 1292. The Ohio Legislature had "drastically" reduced the penalties for nearly all
other crimes so that, for example, the crime of kidnapping, which formerly carried a sentence of
twenty years to life, now has a minimum term of four to seven years. In fact, under the new Ohio
statutes, the only offenses, other than drug-related ones, which impose a minimum penalty of
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It appears likely that the holding in Downey, coming from a federal circuit
court, will influence other courts to examine in some depth eighth amendment
challenges based upon a claim of disproportionality. It is possible that this
opinion might form the basis for a successful challenge to New York's
statutory punishment for marijuana offenses. At the very least the Downey
decision represents a significant development in the evolving interpretation of
the eighth amendment.
Debora Grobman
Constitutional Law-Statute Permitting Adoption of Illegitimate Child
Without Father's Consent Is Not Violative of Equal Protection.-Hector
Orsini and Corrine Caberti, an unmarried couple, lived together for nearly
three and one-half years during which time a child was born. Soon after the
couple's separation in 1972, Orsini admitted paternity in a New York Family
Court proceeding whereupon he was directed by the court to make support
payments and was granted visitation rights. When Caberti married in early
1973, her husband filed a petition for approval of his adoption of the child.
Orsini was given notice and appeared to protest the adoption. The Westches-
ter Family Court granted the order of adoption over Orsini's opposition,
finding that New York Domestic Relations Law section 111(3)1 did not
require the consent of the natural father to the adoption of his illegitimate
child.
Relying on the grounds that section 111(3) was unconstitutional under
the due process and equal protection clauses, Orsini appealed directly to the
New York Court of Appeals.2 He contended that the statute discriminated
against him and other "unwed fathers," subjecting them to invidious clas-
sifications based on sex and legitimacy. 3 Although he had notice and an
opportunity to be heard at the proceeding to determine the best interests of
the child, Orsini claimed that he had not been accorded full parental status
under the statute which would have made his consent a prerequisite to the
adoption. 4 Rejecting appellant's equal protection and due process arguments,
more than four to seven years are murder, aggravated murder, and forcible rape of a person
under thirteen years of age. On the basis of these facts, the court found that the statute under
which Downey was sentenced fell below the standard of Weems. Id. at 1291-92.
1. N.Y. Dom. Rel. § 111(3) (McKinney Supp. 1975) (requires consent "[olf the mother,
whether adult or infant, of a child born out of wedlock . . .)
2. The court takes direct appeals from courts of original jurisdiction when the validity of a
state or federal statute is challenged. N.Y. Const. art. 6 § 3(b)(2).
3. New York requires the consent of both natural parents for the adoption of their legitimate
child, N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 111(2) (McKinney Supp. 1975), but only the consent of the natural
mother for adoption of an illegitimate child. Id. § 111(3).
4. Id. 111(2). However, the consent of a parent who has neglected or abandoned the child Is
not required. Id. § 111(4) (McKinney Supp. 1975). Additional grounds for dispensing with the
parent's consent under this section include: surrender of the child to an authorized agency for
adoption; judicial declaration that the child is destitute or dependent; judicial declaration that the
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the Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of section 111(3) and
affirmed the decision of the lower court. In re Malpica-Orsini, 36 N.Y.2d
568, 331 N.E.2d 486, 370 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1975).
Prior to 1972, New York law required only the consent of the mother to the
adoption of an illegitimate child.5 The courts had held repeatedly that notice
of the pending proceeding need not be given to the unwed father.6 Indeed, it
was sometimes asserted that he lacked standing to make any objection
whatsoever to the child's adoption. 7 As late as 1971, the Appellate Division
concluded that the natural father had "no parental rights with respect to a
child born out of wedlock." 8 This minimal parental status accorded unwed
fathers in New York adoption proceedings accurately reflected, for the most
part,9 their treatment in similar proceedings10 in other states."
In 1972, however, the landmark Supreme Court decision in Stanley v.
Illinois12 "changed the rules of the game."' 3 In Stanley, an unmarried man
parent is insane, incompetent, mentally retarded or an habitual drunkard; deprivation of a
parent's civil rights. For purposes of this discussion the foregoing grounds will simply be referred
to as "parental unfitness."
5. Id. § 111(3) (McKinney 1964), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1975); see Doe v. Roe, 37 App.
Div. 2d 433, 326 N.Y.S.2d 421 (2d Dep't 1971); In re Anderson, 187 Misc. 740, 65 N.Y.S.2d 169
(Child. Ct. 1946); In re Anonymous, 178 Misc. 142, 33 N.Y.S.2d 793 (Sur. Ct. 1942).
6. Doe v. Roe, 37 App. Div. 2d 433, 326 N.Y.S.2d 421 (2d Dep't 1971); In re Brousal, 66
Misc. 2d 711, 322 N.Y.S.2d 28 (Sur. CL 1971).
7. Doe v. Roe, 37 App. Div. 2d 433, 326 N.Y.S.2d 421 (2d Dep't 1971); In re Brousal, 66
Misc. 2d 711, 322 N.Y.S.2d 28 (Sur. Ct. 1971).
8. Doe v. Roe, 37 App. Div. 2d 433, 436, 326 N.Y.S.2d 421, 424 (2d Dep't 1971).
9. There were exceptions. See, e.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. § 56-106 (c) (1971) (requiring the father's
consent where paternity has been judicially established).
10. Less favored treatment has not been limited to adoption proceedings. State laws also have
discriminated against the unwed father regarding such basic parental privileges as custody of the
child and visitatiop rights. Comment, The Emerging Constitutional Protection of the Putative
Father's Parental Rights, 70 Mich. L. Rev. 1581, 1581-85 (1972). In recent years New York
courts have granted the natural father visitation rights where he has lived with the illegitimate
child, acted as its father, and supported it in accordance with his means. In re Anonymous, 12
Misc. 2d 211, 172 N.Y.S.2d 186 (Sup. Ct. 1958). The unwed mother has a right to custody
superior to that of the unwed father unless she is proved unfit. Roe v. Doe, 58 Misc. 2d 757, 296
N.Y.S.2d 865 (Family Ct. 1968). But see Godinez v. Russo, 49 Misc. 2d 66, 266 N.Y.S.2d 636
(Family Ct. 1966) (criticizing this presumption and awarding the child to the father where the
best interests of the child so warranted).
11. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 224 (West 1954); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 210, § 2 (Supp. 1975);
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 710.3 (1968), as amended, Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 710.31 (Supp.
1975); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 9:3-18(0, -19.1 (1960).
12. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
13. Doe v. Department of Social Servs., 71 Misc. 2d 666, 670, 337 N.Y.S.2d 102, 107 (Sup.
Ct. 1972). Stanley concerned a guardianship, rather than an adoption proceeding. This court
stated that "the same considerations in determining the father's status are applicable" in both
proceedings and "[tihis purported differentiation is without substance." Id. at 669, 337 N.Y.S.2d
at 106. High state court rulings in other adoption cases have implicitly agreed with this rationale.
See notes 19-28 infra and accompanying text. There are, however, significant distinctions which
will be discussed herein. See notes 77-80 infra and accompanying text.
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and woman lived together for eighteen years during which time they raised
their three illegitimate children. Upon the woman's death, the state of Illinois
deprived Stanley of the custody of his two youngest children by declaring
them to be without a parent or legal guardian and hence dependent on the
state pursuant to a state statute' 4 that defined parent so as to exclude natural
fathers of illegitimate children. The state was not burdened, therefore, with
the necessity of proving Stanley's parental unfitness, which was required to
remove children from the care of a nonconsenting "parent" under the stat-
ute. ' 5 On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected Stanley's claim that the
statutory discrimination between unwed fathers and all other parents denied
him equal protection.' 6 The Supreme Court reversed the Illinois judgment,
holding that due process entitled Stanley to a hearing on his fitness as a parent
before his children were taken from him, and that the denial to unwed fathers
of the fitness hearing afforded to all other parents constituted a violation of
equal protection.17
Relying almost totally on a due process analysis to reach its decision in
Stanley, 18 the Supreme Court never clearly delineated the equal protection
standard which it deemed applicable to the case. However, the broad
language used by the Court to describe the importance of the natural
father-child relationship,' 9 coupled with the equal protection holding, soon
prompted reversals in adoption cases in Wisconsin and Illinois. 20
In State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Services,2 1 the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court upheld the statutory denial to the unwed father of the right to
notice and an opportunity to be heard concerning the adoption of his children.
However, the United States Supreme Court vacated and remanded the
decision for reconsideration in light of the ruling in Stanley. 22 On remand, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court ordered a new hearing at which the natural father's
14. 111. Ann. Stat. ch. 37, § 701-14 (Smith-Hurd 1972). Parents, under the statute, included
the mother of an illegitimate child, both parents of a legitimate child, and adoptive parents.
15. Id. ch. 4, § 9.1-8 (Smith-Hurd 1975). Stanley received notice, but the only question to
which he was permitted to address himself at the hearing was whether he had ever been legally
married to the deceased mother. 405 U.S. at 646-47.
16. In re Stanley, 45 Ill. 2d 132, 134, 256 N.E.2d 814, 815 (1970). The court found that tle
distinction between unwed mothers and unwed fathers was rationally related to the purposes of
the Juvenile Court Act, i.e., to secure the child care and guidance that would serve his moral,
emotional, mental, and physical well being. 111. Ann. Stat. ch. 37, § 701-2 (Smith-Hurd 1972).
17. 405 U.S. at 658.
18. Id. at 649-58. The Court's due process analysis formed the basis of Chief Justice
Burger's dissent. Burger accused the majority of reaching out to find a due process issue which
had never been asserted in the lower courts. Thus, he maintained, the Court decided Stanley by
improperly expanding its jurisdiction. Id. at 659-62.
19. Id. at 651-52.
20. People ex rel. Slawek v. Covenant Child. Home, 52 11. 2d 20, 284 N.E.2d 291 (1972);
State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Servs., 59 Wis. 2d 1, 207 N.W.2d 826 (1973).
21. 47 Wis. 2d 420, 178 N.W.2d 56 (1970), vacated sub nom. Rothstein v. Lutheran Social
Servs., 405 U.S. 1051 (1972).
22. Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Servs., 405 U.S. 1051 (1972).
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rights to his child could only be terminated on the same grounds upon which
Wisconsin could terminate any parent's rights.23 In addition the court de-
clared unconstitutional the state statute which provided for adoption of an
illegitimate child after consent by the natural mother alone.2 4 It concluded
that until the legislature devised statutes consistent with Stanley, "[clonsent of
both the unwed mother and the unwed father, or consent of one parent with
proper termination of the parental rights of the other . " 2 would be a
prerequisite to adoption.
Stanley precipitated a similar reevaluation of the treatment of unwed
fathers in Illinois adoption proceedings. The Illinois Supreme Court in People
ex rel. Slawek v. Covenant Children's Honre 2 6 awarded an unwed father
custody of his son after the child's adoption had been finalized without
consent of, or notice to, the natural father. The court interpreted Stanley as
recognizing "that the interests of the father of an illegitimate child are no
different from those of other parents."2 7 Thus, the court continued:
State laws which deny a hearing to determine the fitness of a father for the custody of
his children born out of wedlock while extending this right to other parents are based
upon an unreasonable distinction and violate equal-protection principles. 2'
Responding to this judicial stimulus, the Wisconsin and Illinois legislatures
have recently amended their states' adoption statutes to require notice to the
unwed father and his consent to the adoption of his illegitimate child.2 9 A
similar enactment followed a decision in Washington 30 while other state
23. 59 Wis. 2d 1, 10-11, 207 N.W.2d 826, 830 (1973). Grounds for termination of parental
rights in Wisconsin include abandonment, neglect, and unfitness. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48.40 (Supp.
1975). The Wisconsin Supreme Court later terminated Rothstein's parental rights on the basis of
his repeated denials of paternity during the mother's pregnancy and his total disregard for the
quality of the mother's prenatal care. State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Servs., 68 Wis. 2d
36, 227 N.W.2d 643 (1975).
24. 59 Wis. 2d at 9, 207 N.W.2d at 830; Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48.84 (1957), as amended (Supp.
1975).
25. 59 Wis. 2d at 9, 207 N.W.2d at 830.
26. 52 IMl. 2d 20, 284 N.E.2d 291 (1972).
27. Id. at 22, 284 N.E.2d at 292.
28. Id. The judgment in Slawek was foreshadowed by an opinion of the Illinois Attorney
General that after Stanley, consent to an illegitimate child's adoption would have to be obtained
from both the natural mother and father. 1972 Op. Att'y Gen. Ill. 142-43; see Vanderlaan v.
Vanderlaan, 9 M1. App. 3d 260, 292 N.E.2d 145, vacated & remanded, 405 U.S. 1051 (1972) (on
reconsideration in light of Stanley the Illinois Supreme Court held that the best interests of two
illegitimate children would be served by granting custody to the natural father).
29. lI. Ann. Stat ch. 4, §§ 9.1-1 E, 9.1-8(a)'(Smith-Hurd 1975); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48.84
(Supp. 1975).
30. In re Harp, 6 Wash. App. 701, 495 P.2d 1059 (1972). Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.32.030
(Supp. 1975) provides that written consent to the adoption must be obtained from the mother and
father of an illegitimate child. The Oregon legislature has not yet reacted to a Ninth Circuit
decision that declared that state's adoption consent statute unconstitutional due to its discrimina-
tion against the unwed father. Miller v. Miller, 504 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
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legislatures have initiated such amendments in the wake of Stanley without
judicial insistence. 31
The New York courts, on the other hand, have tended to construe Stanley
more narrowly than other jurisdictions. In Doe v. Department of Social
Services,32 a New York court for the first time considered the impact of
Stanley on New York adoption law. In that case, a putative father brought a
habeas corpus action to contest the adoption of his daughter. The petitioner
had not received notice or a hearing although he had acknowledged paternity
and supported the child for half of her life. The court found that, in view of
Stanley's recognition of the unwed father's cognizable and substantial inter-
ests in his child, the long standing precedents for denying the putative father
any status to contest adoption were no longer viable. 33 The court concluded
that section 111(3) must be read to provide that "the mother's exclusive or sole
consent suffices only where there has been no formal or unequivocal acknowl-
edgment or recognition of paternity by the father. '34 Yet the court continued
cautiously-
It is not that the [unwed] father's consent is now necessary as a condition precedent to
adoption, but rather that he be served with 'notice' [and be allowed the opportunity]
to present facts for the court's consideration in determining what is in the best
interests of the child. 35
In so construing the mandate of Stanley, the court perpetuated a crucial
statutory distinction between unwed fathers and other parents. Though
assuring the natural father of notice and a hearing at which his parental
fitness would be a factor considered in arriving at a disposition in the child's
"best interests," the court refrained from conferring upon the unwed father
the "veto power" against the adoption held by any other parent under the
statute.36 This interpretation of Stanley was accepted in several subsequent
New York decisions 37 although some New York courts expressed uncertainty
over whether such a conservative revision of the present statute was consis-
tent with Stanley's equal protection holding. 38 However, New York's highest
court did not address the issue until Orsini.
The primary question 39 presented to the New York Court of Appeals in
31. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Ann. § 45-61(i) (Supp. 1975); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 710.31
(Supp. 1975); Va. Code Ann. § 63.1-225 (Supp. 1975).
32. 71 Misc. 2d 666, 337 N.Y.S.2d 102 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
33. Id. at 670, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 107.
34. Id. at 671, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 107.
35. Id.
36. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 111(3) (McKinney Supp. 1975).
37. In re Anonymous, 78 Misc. 2d 1037, 359 N.Y.S.2d 220 (Sur. Ct. 1974); Pierce v.
Yerhovich, 80 Misc. 2d 613, 616, 363 N.Y.S.2d 403, 404 (Family Ct. 1974).
38. In re Male L., - Misc. 2d -, -, 369 N.Y.S.2d 273, 276 (Sur. Ct. 1975); People ex
rel. Blake v. Charger, 76 Misc. 2d 577, 580, 351 N.Y.S.2d 322, 327 (Family Ct. 1974); see In re
Dionisio, 81 Misc. 2d 436 n.1, 366 N.Y.S.2d 280, 282 n.1 (Family Ct. 1975); text accompany-
ing notes 19-28 supra.
39. Although Orsini claimed that he was denied due process as well as equal protection, there
was no disagreement among the judges of the Court of Appeals that the notice and hearing which
Orsini received satisfied the due process requirements outlined in Stanley, since he was given an
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Orsini was whether Stanley further dictated that the consent of the unwed
father, like that of all other parents, must be made a prerequisite to adop-
tion.40 Since Orsini's complaint was based on the discriminatory statutory
classification of unwed fathers, the Court of Appeals focused its inquiry on the
appropriate standard of equal protection review.4 ' The court noted the
general dissatisfaction with the traditional two-tier equal protection stan-
dard. 42 Stanley provided no clarification of this issue since the Supreme Court
in that case reached its equal protection holding by a due process rationale. 43
Nor did the post-Stanley state court decisions offer a guideline for Orsini since
those courts based their rulings squarely on Stanley's precedent rather than
developing an equal protection standard for the case at hand."4 The court
therefore looked to the Supreme Court's analysis in Weber v. Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co.45 that "'mark[ed] one of the most overt attempts by the
Court to escape the rigid two-tier framework .... *"'46 The Court of Appeals
also noted that the Weber analysis was the most appropriate for the particu-
larly sensitive problems in legitimacy cases since it goes to "'the merits of the
particular controversy at hand . . . . allow[ing] a realistic examination of
conflicting policies and interests in a challenged statute . . . . , "4 The Weber
test involves a dual inquiry-. What "legitimate state interest does the classifica-
tion promote," and what "fundamental personal rights" does the classification
endanger?48 Using this twofold measure and emphasizing that the child's
welfare was the paramount consideration in review of adoption procedures,
the Orsini court then reiterated its preliminary conclusion that the statute
served the legitimate state purpose of securing a normal home for the child
and that the discriminatory classification of the unwed father bore a sig-
nificant relation.hip to this recognized purpose. 49
opportunity to present evidence concerning his fitness as a parent before his parental rights were
terminated. 36 N.Y.2d at 577, 331 N.E.2d at 492, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 520.
40. Id. at 576, 331 N.E.2d at 492, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 519.
41. The task is especially difficult when, as in the instant case, the challenged classification
touches upon illegitimacy or sex. Recent Supreme Court decisions in these areas have reflected the
rapidly changing attitudes toward the role of marriage and women in our society. See Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). Compare Hoyt v. Florida,
368 U.S. 57 (1961) with Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). The law is still in a state of
ferment and no clear cut new equal protection standards of review have yet emerged. See
Comment, Illegitimacy and Equal Protection, 49 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 479, 480-89 (1974); Note, The
Emerging Bifurcated Standard for Classifications Based on Sex, 1975 Duke L.J. 163, 174-77.
42. See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forard: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1972);
Comment, Equal Protection in Transition: An Analysis and a Proposal, 41 Fordham L. Rev. 605
(1973).
43. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
44. See notes 19-28 supra and accompanying text.
45. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
46. 36 N.Y.2d at 575, 331 N.E.2d at 491, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 518.
47. Id.
48. 406 U.S. at 173.
49. 36 N.Y.2d at 575, 331 N.E.2d at 489, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 519. In a seemingly illogical
juxtaposition of its arguments on the equal protection issue, the court found the classification in
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The court based its conclusion that the statute was reasonable on a number
of arguments which do not seem to withstand critical scrutiny. The court's
conclusion that administrative and economic efficiency justified the statute's
discriminatory treatment of unwed fathers is the very contention which was
dismissed by the Supreme Court in Stanley as both illusory and unpersuasive
because of the important personal interests involved in such a case. 50 The
court's fear that a reclassification would continue to visit the stigma of
illegitimacy on the child-' is also cast into doubt by Stanley. In that case, the
Supreme Court questioned whether such a stigma is so pervasive as to
warrant " 'permanent termination of a subsisting relationship with the child's
father.' ",52 The Supreme Court further stated that it had not refused to
recognize those family relationships unlegitimized by a marriage ceremony
since the interpersonal bonds in such cases "were often as warm, enduring,
and important as those arising within a more formally organized family
unit. '5 3 The Court of Appeals also asserted that making the unwed father's
consent a prerequisite to adoption would provide him with an opportunity for
extortion and hence, contribute to the black market for adoptive children.5 4
Yet if such a danger exists, surely a more appropriate remedy lies in the
enforcement of severe penalties aimed at the abuse itself."s The possibility
envisioned by the court that couples would be dissuaded from adoption by the
potential for harassment by the natural father5 6 ignores current statutory and
case law which provides for such a contingency by ensuring prospective
parents complete anonymity throughout the adoptive process.5 7 The court
stated that elimination of the present statutory presumption would create
difficulties in determining which unwed fathers were deserving of co-equal
parental status in the adoption proceeding.58 Other states have dealt with this
problem by devising statutes which grant the natural father parental status
only if he has previously acknowledged paternity and can demonstrate to the
court's satisfaction that he has properly exercised his parental duties.5 9 In
N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 111(3) (McKinney Supp. 1975) "reasonable" and "justified" even before
selecting the analytical method by which the statute was ostensibly to be tested. 36 N.Y.2d at
574, 331 N.E.2d at 491, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 517; see notes 64-68 infra and accompanying text.
50. 405 U.S. at 656-57.
51. 36 N.Y.2d at 572, 331 N.E.2d at 489, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 516.
52. 405 U.S. at 654-55 n.7, quoting In re Mark T., 8 Mich. App. 122, 146, 154 N.W.2d 27,
39 (1967).
53. 405 U.S. at 652.
54. 36 N.Y.2d at 573, 331 N.E.2d at 490, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 516-17.
55. See, e.g., N.Y. Penal Law § 155.05 (McKinney 1975) (extortion).
56. 36 N.Y.2d at 572-73, 331 N.E.2d at 489-90, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 516.
57. People ex rel. Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv., 28 N.Y.2d 185, 195, 269
N.E.2d 787, 793, 321 N.Y.S.2d 65, 73, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 805 (1971) (court found that the
public policy favoring anonymity is reflected in N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law). The Social Services Law
provides that contact is to be exclusively between parents and the adoption agency. The agency,
therefore, acts as an "insulating intermediary" to ensure the separation of natural parents and
prospective adoptive parents. Id.; see N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law §§ 383-84 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
58. 36 N.Y.2d at 576, 331 N.E.2d at 492, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 519.
59. See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 710.33 (Supp. 1975). Another alternative would be
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maintaining that marriage would be discouraged if the unwed father's consent
were a condition precedent to adoption,60 the court overemphasized the
formalistic aspects of the marital bonds at the expense of concern for the
enduring parent-child relationship that is the raison d'etre for the institution
of marriage. 6 1 Moreover, this objection, like every other argument advanced
by the majority in support of the statutory bias against unwed fathers, can
also be put forward, mutatis mutandis, to justify such treatment for unwed
mothers and divorced fathers. 62 The court set forth no specific justifications
for the statutory denial of the unwed father's consent as a prerequisite when
such a requirement is categorically awarded by the statute to all other
parents. 63
Moreover, an examination of the majority reasoning suggests that, not-
withstanding the courtes pronouncement that it was employing Weber's ad hoc
balancing test, Orsini was actually decided by a rational basis test.6 Under
Weber, the extensive presumptions of rationality and validity accorded the
statute65 would not seem to be warranted, since it had not yet been deter-
mined whether the interests at issue were of sufficient import to negate such
presumptions. 66 Furthermore, although the court posited that Weber's "dual
to dispense with the necessity of the unwed father's consent if he did not respond promptly upon
receipt of notice to contest the proceeding. Such a provision would eliminate most of those natural
fathers having no serious concern for the welfare of their offLpring. See Stanley v. Illinois, 40S
U.S. 645, 657 n.9 (1972); Catholic Charities v. Zalesky, 232 N.W.2d 539 (Sup. CL Iowa 1975)
(state statute permitting adoption without consent of father of illegitimate child upheld where
statute distinguished between the caring and non-caring parent rather than classifying parents by
sex or legitimacy); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 4, 9.1-12a(4) (Smith-Hurd 1975) (putative father need not be
made a party to the proceeding if he fails to come forward within thirty days after service of
notice).
60. 36 N.Y.2d at 573, 331 N.E.2d at 490, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 517. The court reasoned that
potential husbands would refrain from involving themselves in family situations where they could
only reasonably hope to be foster parents. Id.
61. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651-52 (1972); In re Donna P., 80 Misc. 2d 129,
131-32, 362 N.Y.S.2d 370, 373 (Family Ct. 1974).
62. See Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 Mich. L. Rev. 477, 492-95 (1967).
63. The equal protection clause requires at a minimum that all those similarly situated in
relation to the purpose of the legislation receive equal treatment. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296
(1966). The Orsini court found that the purpose of the statute was to promote the child's best
interests by securing a stable home environment and engendering strong parental relationships.
36 N.Y.2d at 575, 331 N.E.2d at 491, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 519. Yet the court did not explain how
the distinction between unwed fathers and unwed mothers or divorced fathers related to this
legislative purpose. Thus the statute may be viewed both as overinclusive, since it grants veto
power over the adoption to many unwed mothers and divorced fathers who have not proven
themselves worthy to maintain a relationship with their child, and underinclusive, since it denies
this veto power to those unwed fathers who are deserving of full parental status as well as those
who should not be so entitled. See Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 Harv.
L. Rev. 1065, 1082-87 (1969).
64. 36 N.Y.2d at 580, 331 N.E.2d at 495, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 523 (Jones, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 570-71, 331 N.E.2d at 488, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 514.
66. See note 49 supra.
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inquiry" was central to its analysis, 67 the majority never discussed whether
the statute represented an infringement on the basic personal right of the
natural father and his child to maintain their relationship. The Weber test
may be the appropriate mode of analysis for the important parental interests
defined by Stanley, since Weber allows for heightened scrutiny "when state
statutory classifications approach sensitive and fundamental personal rights
.... 68 Yet the majority failed to apply the strictures of the very test which it
had purportedly adopted.
The dissent, on the other hand, found that the parent-child relationship in
Orsini was a fundamental interest which would require the state to demon-
strate that the statutory classification was necessary to promote a compelling
governmental interest. 69 While noting the Supreme Court's reluctance to
expand the number of those rights labeled fundamental for equal protection
purposes, the dissent pointed out that the language of Stanley, which termed
the rights of a man in the child he has sired and raised as" 'essential ... basic
civil rights . . . far more precious .. . than property rights,' "o70 compelled
such a determination. The minority recognized that the welfare of illegitimate
children is undeniably a "compelling state interest," but believed that the
legislature could have fashioned less drastic and more appropriate means to
achieve the desired goal. 71 The statute was unconstitutionally overbroad,
concluded the dissent, because it unnecessarily burdened and restricted the
fundamental right of an unwed father to maintain the natural parent-child
relationship.72
67. 36 N.Y.2d at 574-75, 331 N.E.2d at 490-91, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 517-18.
68. 406 U.S. at 172.
69. 36 N.Y.2d at 581-82, 331 N.E.2d at 495-96, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 524-25 (Jones, J,,
dissenting); see note 40 supra. It has been suggested that the Stanley court created a fundamental
interest in the unwed parent-child relationship for equal protection purposes. See People v.
Olague, 31 Cal. App. 3d 5, 7, 106 Cal. Rptr. 612, 614 (Super. Ct. 1973) (dictum). However, no
court has expressly so held. See notes 19-28 supra and accompanying text.
70. 405 U.S. at 651 (citations omitted).
71. 36 N.Y.2d at 587, 331 N.E.2d at 499, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 529-30 (Jones, J., dissenting).
72. Id.; see Comment, The Emerging Constitutional Protection of the Putative Father's
Parental Rights, 70 Mich. L. Rev. 1581, 1590 (1972). Less persuasive is Judge Fuchsberg's
contention that the sex discrimination of section 111(3) provided an independent ground for a
declaration of the unconstitutionality of the statute. 36 N.Y.2d at 591, 331 N.E.2d at 502, 370
N.Y. S.2d at 533 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting). A majority of the Supreme Court has yet to find sex
a suspect class. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (only plurality considered sex a
suspect class). Moreover, adoption is a process of purely legislative origin which affects a great
many fragile human relationships. Taking these factors into account, it would seem a question-
able exercise of discretion for the Court of Appeals, as Fuchsberg suggests, to use Orsini as a
vehicle to launch a new, stricter New York state equal protection standard.
However, in recent sex classification cases, it has been suggested that the Supreme Court has
employed a "strict rationality" test. Berkelman v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 501 F.2d
1264, 1269 (9th Cir. 1974) (interpreting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) as utilizing this
approach). The fact that the statute in Orsini dealt with this sensitive area should, at the very
least, have provided an additional inducement for the court to weigh the interests involved
carefully under the Weber test.
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A broad reading of Stanley lends some support to the dissenting position,
but the majority's reticence to deal with Orsini's personal relationship with his
child as a "fundamental interest" seems justified, given the Supreme Court's
reluctance to so designate the father-child relationship in Stanley. However, a
forthright acknowledgment by the court of the essential human rights at issue
in Orsini, and a correspondingly rigorous review of the statute under the
Weber test, would have been more consistent not only with the spirit of the
Supreme Court's language in Stanley,73 but also with the holdings of the
Court of Appeals itself.7 4 The Court of Appeals has often described a parent's
concern for the care and control of his child as a "fundamental interest" and a
"paramount" right.75 In a 1974 decision reversing a lower court termination of
the parental rights of a divorced father, the Court of Appeals stated: "Even
where the flame of parental interest is reduced to a flicker the courts may not
properly intervene to dissolve the parentage. The relationship between minor
children and their natural parents is jealously guarded .... ,,76
Having found section 111(3) valid under its equal protection analysis, the
court next distinguished the equal protection in Stanley from the situation in
the case at the bar. Orsini differed from Stanley, declared the court, since
there were "compelling reasons supporting a different legislative classifica-
tion . . . -77 for unwed fathers in adoption proceedings. The opinion,
however, did not articulate the compelling reasons which warranted the
distinction. The court's failure to elaborate on this point is curious in view of
those state court rulings which explicitly or implicitly have equated the
considerations involved in Stanley with those in adoption proceedings. 78
Nonetheless, certain distinctions between cases can be made.
In Stanley, the state intervened to disrupt an existing family unit within
which the natural father was rearing his children. Orsini, on the other hand,
sought not custody of his child, but maintenance of minimal parental ties to
his daughter who was living within the family structure established by the
73. 405 U.S. at 650-52.
74. Susan W. v. Talbot G., 34 N.Y.2d 76, 312 N.E.2d 171, 356 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1974); In re
Ella B., 30 N.Y.2d 352, 285 N.E.2d 288, 334 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1972); Spence-Chapin Adoption
Serv. v. Polk, 29 N.Y.2d 196, 274 N.E.2d 431, 324 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1971).
75. Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv. v. Polk, 29 N.Y.2d 196, 203, 274 N.E.2d .31, 435, 324
N.Y.S.2d 937, 943 (1971); see the cases cited in 36 N.Y.2d at 585, 331 N.E.2d at 498, 370
N.Y.S.2d at 527-28.
76. Susan W. v. Talbot G., 34 N.Y.2d 76, 80, 312 N.E.2d 171, 174, 356 N.Y.S.2d 34, 38
(1974). It should be noted, however, that a growing number of lower court cases have challenged
the emphasis placed by the Court of Appeals in this case on the rights of a natural parent to his or
her child. These decisions hold that far greater weight should be given to the child's right to a
permanent, stable environment. These courts, therefore, have rejected any presumption that the
child's welfare lies with the biological parents, maintaining rather that the child's best interests
are served by placement in the most secure and loving home. People ex rel. Blake v. Charger, 76
MAisc. 2d 577, 351 N.Y.S.2d 322 (Family CL 1974); In re Catherine S., 74 Misc. 2d 154, 347
N.Y.S.2d 470 (Family Ct. 1973); Godinez v. Russo, 49 Misc. 2d 66, 266 N.Y.S.2d 636 (Family
Ct. 1966).
77. 36 N.Y.2d at 577, 331 N.E.2d at 493, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 520.
78. See notes 13 & 19-28 supra and accompanying text.
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appellee and his wife. While the enforced separation of the children from their
father that occurred in Stanley could hardly be expected to promote the
children's welfare,7 9 the severance of the far less substantial, noncustodial ties
between Orsini and his daughter has been approved by some psychologists as
contributing to the child's necessary sense of living within a secure and
permanent familial framework.8 0
While this difference between Stanley and Orsini may distinguish Stanley
as precedent, it offers little additional insight into why the different standards
which prevail in adoption proceedings must weigh so heavily upon unwed
fathers alone. Thus the distinction suggests no further justification for the
present disparity of treatment under the statute.
The Court of Appeals in Orsini has chosen to restrict Stanley's application
to the New York adoption process. 81 Orsini is not the first state court since
Stanley to defer revision of the adoption consent statute to the wisdom of the
legislature. 82 Orsini is the first case since Stanley, however, in which the
highest state court has fully sustained an adoption consent which discrimi-
nated against the parental rights of the unwed father.
Throughout its opinion, the majority in Orsini emphasized that the primary
concern expressed by the legislature in section 111(3) was the "welfare of the
children involved rather than with the allocation of rights between the mother
and the usually uncertain and reluctant father of the children born out of
wedlock. '8 3 The infirmity of section 111(3) is that in pursuit of the admirable
goal of the child's best interests, the legislature has unnecessarily demeaned
the basic rights of the unwed father to the maintenance of his relationship
with a child he has sired and raised. Ironically, under the ironclad presump-
tions of the present statute, the consent of the unfeeling and irresponsible
unwed mother or divorced father is a prerequisite to adoption while the
constructive and loving contact between an unwed father and his child is
79. J. Goldstein, A. Freud & A. Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child 31-34 (1974).
80. Id. at 25, 38. But the sword cuts both ways. Judge Fuchsberg, in his dissent, cited the
same authority to support the proposition that a severance of the bonds between the natural
father and child could well have devastating effects upon the child's personality. 36 N.Y.2d at
591, 331 N.E.2d at 502, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 533. The clear preference of the authors, however, Is
for the least detrimental alternative for the child in such a situation. J. Goldstein, A. Freud & A.
Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child 53 (1974).
81. An issue unresolved by Orsini is whether Stanley necessitates notice to all putative
fathers, including those whose paternity has neither been admitted nor judicially established. The
language of Stanley, which speaks of the interest "of a man in the children he has sired and
raised" is susceptible to two interpretations. It can be taken to mean that the blood relationship
alone constitutes the natural father's substantial interest or that such an interest is only
established through continued personal interaction between the father and his child. In any event,
unwarranted delays in the adoptive process can be avoided by a statutory scheme providing for
"reasonable efforts" to notify the father and for termination of parental rights if the natural father
fails to assert his interest within a specified time period. See 1l1. Ann. Stat. ch. 4, § 9.1-12a(4)
(Smith-Hurd 1975); Comment, The Emerging Constitutional Protection of the Putative Father's
Parental Rights, 70 Mich. L. Rev. 1581, 1606-07 (1972).
82. In re Harp, 6 Wash. App. 701, 495 P.2d 1059 (1972).
83. 36 N.Y.2d at 578, 331 N.E.2d at 493, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 521.
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terminable by adoption without the father's consent. In this way the statute
can frustrate the very purposes for which it was designed s4
So long as the legislature chooses to retain the present statutory scheme, the
continued denial of full parental status to the unwed father who has assumed
parental responsibility for his child is unjustified. If the legislature is per-
suaded, however, that parental veto power over a child's adoption is too often
responsible for "denying homes to the homeless and . ..depriving innocent
children of the other blessings of adoption . . . ...8 the Arizona statute8 6
discussed by Judge Jones in his dissent offers a far more equitable solution
than the present New York law. That statute requires the unwed father's
consent to the adoption in the same manner as any other parent if he has
officially acknowledged paternity or his paternity has been established in a
judicial proceeding.8 7 The court can waive the consent requirement of any
parent, however, if it finds adoption to be in the best interests of the child. 8
Michael J. Malone
Constitutional Law-Zoning Ordinance Which Classifies and Regulates
Adult Movie Theatres and Bookstores Solely on the Basis of the Con-
tent of the Materials Which They Purvey Held Violative of Equal
Protection Clause.-In 1962 the city of Detroit adopted an Official Zoning
Ordinance which prohibited certain types of businesses from concentrating,
requiring them to maintain minimum distances from each other. In 1972, in
an attempt to control the emerging concentrations of adult-type entertainment
businesses, the city adopted a series of amendments to the Official Zoning
Ordinance which added "adult" movie theatres and bookstores, together with
"go-go" establishments and topless bars, to the list of regulated businesses'
84. See In re Tyease, - Misc. 2d __ 373 N.Y.S.2d 447 (Sur. CL 1975). In that case, the
court applauded Orsini as a vindication of the child's constitutional right to a permanent, stable
home. See note 76 supra. The court acknowledged, however, that the Court of Appeals only
reached the result in Orsini by upholding an outmoded legislative structure greatly in need of
revision. The court was amenable to a statutory amendment similar to the Arizona statute
discussed in the text. Id. at _ 373 N.Y.S.2d at 450-51; see text accompanying notes 85-88 infra.
85. 36 N.Y.2d at 572, 331 N.E.2d at 489, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 516.
86. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8-106 (1974).
87. Id. § 8-106(A)(1)(d) (1974).
88. Id. § 8-106(C) (1974).
1. The list included hotels or motels, pawnshops, pool or billiard halls, public lodging houses,
secondhand stores, shoeshine parlors, and taxi dance halls. American Mini Theatres, Inc. v.
Gribbs, 518 F.2d 1014, 1016 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3234 (U.S. Oct. 21,
1975) (No. 75-312). "[T]here are some uses which, because of their very nature, are recognized as
having serious objectionable operational characteristics, particularly when several of them are
concentrated under certain circumstances.. .. Special regulation of these uses is necessary to
insure that these adverse effects will not contribute to the blighting or downgrading of the
surrounding neighborhood. . . . The primary control or regulation is for the purpose of
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which, by their very nature, were considered to have a deleterious effect upon
the neighborhoods. The ordinance regulated the location of these businesses
by prohibiting more than two such uses within one thousand feet of each
other, and by making it unlawful to establish any adult theatre, adult
bookstore or Class D cabaret 2 within five hundred feet of a residential,
dwelling or rooming unit. 3 Plaintiffs were lessees and operators in the city of
Detroit of so-called adult motion picture theatres and an adult bookstore
which were directly affected by the zoning ordinances.
Plaintiffs asserted that these city ordinances deprived them of their four-
teenth amendment right to equal protection of the law granted to other
theatre operators and bookstores, and that the ordinances violated the first
amendment. 4 Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The district
court declared those portions of the ordinances which prohibited such uses
within five hundred feet of a dwelling unit invalid, but declared the prohibi-
tion against two or more regulated uses within one thousand feet of one
another to be valid.5 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in a split
decision, reversed the judgment of the district court and declared that the
1972 ordinances were invalid under the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment. 6 American Mini Theatres, Inc. v. Gribbs, 518 F.2d 1014
(6th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3234 (U.S. Oct. 21, 1975) (No.
75-312).
The complexities of modern life demand that the legislature be allowed to
establish zoning ordinances which classify property according to the uses to
which it is put and to regulate such uses.7 In Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co. 8 the Supreme Court upheld a comprehensive zoning ordinance
which provided for the creation and maintenance of residential districts from
which commercial and industrial uses were barred. The Court reviewed the
preventing a concentration of these uses in any one area (i.e. not more than two such uses
within one thousand feet of each other which would create such adverse effects)." Id.
2. Under the ordinance, adult bookstores and adult theatres are "distinguished or charac-
terized by an emphasis on matter depicting, describing or relating to 'Specified Sexual
Activities' or 'Specified Anatomical Areas' . . . ." Id. at 1015. Class D cabarets feature topless
dancers, exotic dancers, strippers and similar entertainers. Id. at 1016.
3. Nortown Theatre Inc. v. Gribbs, 373 F. Supp. 363, 365-66 (E.D. Mich. 1974), rev'd sub
nom. American Mini Theatres, Inc. v. Gribbs, 518 F.2d 1014 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 44
U.S.L.W. 3234 (U.S. Oct. 21, 1975) (No. 75-312).
4. Plaintiffs argued that the ordinances abridged their right to disseminate materials presum-
ably protected by the free speech clause. They also claimed violation of the due process clause in
that the ordinances contained overly vague language and did not provide procedural safeguards.
373 F. Supp. at 365. However, the court of appeals did not discuss the merits of the due process
challenges. American Mini Theatres, Inc. v. Gribbs, 518 F.2d 1014, 1019 (6th Cir. 1975),
cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3234 (U.S. Oct. 21, 1975) (No. 75-312).
5. 373 F. Supp. at 371.
6. Only the ordinance's provision relating to the one thousand foot prohibition was before the
court on appeal. 518 F.2d at 1021 n.2 (Celebrezze, J., dissenting).
7. See 8 E. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 25.02 (3d ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as
McQuillin].
8. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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purposes of zoning9 and concluded that the ordinance must find its justifica-
tion in the legitimate exercise of the state's police power asserted for the
general welfare. 10 The role of the courts in reviewing challenges to the
constitutionality of such statutes is well settled,II and, in general, the scope of
judicial review of zoning ordinances is limited.' 2 If it is not clear that the
zoning authorities abused their power or acted ultra vires, then the court will
not superimpose its judgment on legislative discretion.' 3
Zoning ordinances, by their very nature, must delineate boundaries, make
distinctions, and establish classifications. Since zoning laws are clearly subject
to the limitations of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
9. Id. at 394. For additional purposes of zoning, see Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 73-74
(1917); N.Y. Town Law § 263 (McKinney 1965); N.Y. Village Law § 7-704 (McKinney 1973); D.
Hagman, Urban Planning and Land Development Control Law §§ 41-52 (1971); McQuillin,
supra note 7, § 25.17; Note, Zoning- Permissible Purposes, 50 Colum. L. Rev. 202 (1950).
10. 272 U.S. at 387.
11. Under the general rule, zoning statutes or ordinances are presumed to be valid. E.g., City
of Ann Arbor v. Northwest Park Constr. Corp., 280 F.2d 212, 223 (6th Cir. 1960). However,
because zoning ordinances are in derogation of common-law property rights, they must be
construed strictly against the municipality and in favor of the landowner's unrestricted use of his
property. Gino's, Inc. v. City of Baltimore, 250 Md. 621, 643, 244 A.2d 218, 230 (1968);
Thomson Indus., Inc. v. Incorporated Village of Port Washington N., 27 N.Y.2d 537, 539, 261
N.E.2d 260, 313 N.Y.S.2d 117 (1970); 440 E. 102nd St. Corp. v. Murdock, 285 N.Y. 298, 304,
34 N.E.2d 329, 331 (1941). See McQuillin, supra note 7, §§ 25.72-.73. An ordinance that totally
prohibits a lawful enterprise will have to meet a higher standard of justification than one that
merely regulates the location and operation of such an enterprise. Beaver Gasoline Co. v.
Osborne Borough, 445 Pa. 571, 285 A.2d 501 (1971) (zoning ordinance which totally excluded
particular business from the entire municipality must bear a more substantial relationship to the
public health, safety, and welfare than an ordinance which merely confined that business to a
certain area in the municipality). See McQuillin, supra note 7, § 25.119b. The provision of the
Detroit ordinance which prohibited adult theatres and bookstores from locating within 500 feet of
a single dwelling or rooming unit had the effect of an almost total ban on such uses. It wvas
declared invalid by the district court because the city could not meet the higher standard of
justification. Nortown Theatre Inc. v. Gribbs, 373 F. Supp. 363, 370 (1974), rev'd sub nom.
American Mini Theatres, Inc. v. Gribbs, 518 F.2d 1014 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 44
U.S.L.W. 3234 (U.S. Oct. 21, 1975) (No. 75-312).
Enactment of zoning ordinances and regulations is best entrusted to local governments because
of their familiarity with and proximity to local matters. "We recognize, of course, that zoning
ordinances are matters within the peculiar knowledge, competency, and jurisdiction of local
authorities." City of Miami v. Woolin, 387 F.2d 893, 894 (5th Cir. 1968). Cf. Gorieb v. Fox, 274
U.S. 603, 608 (1927). If the object is within the authority of the legislature, then the means by
which it will be attained is also for the legislature to determine. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S.
26, 33 (1954).
12. Aquino v. Tobriner, 298 F.2d 674, 677 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Thomas v. Towvn of Bedford, 11
N.Y.2d 428, 433-34, 184 N.E.2d 285, 287, 230 N.Y.S.2d 684, 687 (1962).
13. Valley View Village, Inc. v. Proffett, 221 F.2d 412, 417 (6th Cir. 1955); see Williams v.
Town of Oyster Bay, 32 N.Y.2d 78, 81, 295 N.E.2d 788, 790, 343 N.Y.S.2d 118, 121 (1973).
"[W]hether that determination was an unreasonable, arbitrary or unequal exercise of power is
fairly debatable. In such circumstances, the settled rule of this court is that it will not substitute
its judgment for that of the legislative body charged with the primary duty and responsibility of
determining the question." Zabn v. Board of Pub. Works, 274 U.S. 325, 328 (1927).
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ment,' 4 claims alleging unequal protection of the law inevitably arise as a
result of such classification.' 5
In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas'6 the Supreme Court upheld the validity
of a zoning ordinance which restricted land use to one-family dwellings. The
ordinance defined the word "family" as
"[O]ne or more persons related by blood, adoption, or marriage, living and cooking
together as a single housekeeping unit, exclusive of household servants. A number of
persons but not exceeding two (2) living and cooking together as a single housekeeping
unit though not related by blood, adoption, or marriage shall be deemed to constitute
a family.' 7
Affected by the ordinance were three tenants, unrelated to one another by
blood, adoption, or marriage, who challenged the validity of the ordinance on
the ground that it interfered with their right to travel and their rights of
association and privacy. But the majority found that no fundamental rights
were involved, and so they applied the rational relationship test. 18
Similar questions have arisen in another context. In recent years many
communities have attempted to check the tide of "fast-service" or "drive-in"
restaurants. While many of the cases, in this area were concerned with the
question of whether a particular establishment was included within the zoning
classification,' 9 courts have upheld the special treatment of drive-in res-
taurants as reasonably related to the state's interest in the prevention of the
noise, litter, congestion, patron misconduct, and similar problems characteris-
tic of such establishments. 2 0 However, the courts still demand that the zoning
14. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); McQuillin, supra note 7,
§§ 25.61, 25.122-.123; Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Calif. L,
Rev. 341 (1949); Comment, Equal Protection, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1065 (1969).
15. "To decide whether a law violates the Equal Protection Clause, we look, in essence, to
three things: the character of the classification in question; the individual interests affected by tile
classification; and the governmental interests asserted in support of the classification." Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972). See also Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 173
(1972).
16. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
17. Id. at 2 (quoting statute). In Y.W.C.A. v. Board of Adjustment, 341 A.2d 356, 359-60
(N.J. Super. 1975) the court held that the board of adjustment could not distinguish between
residents of group homes and natural families in determining which single-family district would
be open to group homes. See also City of White Plains v. Ferraoli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 305-06, 313
N.E.2d 756, 758, 357 N.Y.S.2d 449, 452-53 (1974).
18. 416 U.S. at 7-8. In a dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Marshall viewed the classification as
an unnecessary infringement of fundamental rights, and argued for the use of the test of close
scrutiny and compelling state interest. Id. at 15 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
19. E.g., Burger King, Inc. v. Weisz, 444 S.W.2d 517 (Mo. App. 1969) (per curiam) (whether
plaintiffs establishment was a "drive-in" restaurant); Vitolo v. Chave, 63 Misc. 2d 971, 314
N.Y.S.2d 51 (Sup. Ct. 1970) (whether public eating house was permitted under ordinance
allowing restaurants other than drive-in restaurants). See also Annot., 82 A.L.R.2d 989 (1962).
20. Gino's, Inc. v. City of Baltimore, 250 Md. 621, 638, 244 A.2d 218, 227-28 (1968)
(ordinance which required, before commencement of operation of eating establishment, the prior
approval of the city council held valid); Morris v. Postma, 41 N.J. 354, 360-62, 196 A.2d 792,
796-97 (1964) (per curiam) (ordinance forbidding drive-in restaurants was validly enacted on basis
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regulations not transgress "specific constitutional limitations,"'-2 or deprive
affected persons of their constitutional guarantees, regardless of the worth or
urgency of the municipality's goal.22
The courts have permitted eating establishments, not properly classifiable
as restaurants, under zoning ordinances allowing restaurants, tea rooms,
parking lots and gas stations, when their operations were similar to and
consistent with other permitted commercial uses in the area.23 However, the
mere fact that the zoning ordinance regulates or prohibits certain uses on the
land or prevents the owner from obtaining the highest possible return on the
land does not make the ordinance invalid. 24
Because of the "preferred position" accorded to the right of free speech and
other fundamental freedoms,25 a statute challenged as an abridgment of
these rights is not presumed valid, and the government must bear the burden
of showing its constitutionality. 26 However, in the context of first amendment
rights the Court has excluded some forms of expression, such as obscenity and
libel, from the protection of the constitutional guarantee.2 7
of bad experience with prior restaurant, notwithstanding the fact that plaintiffs application was
submitted before enactment). See also Annot., 91 A.L.R.2d 572 (1963). For a discussion of the
relationship between zoning laws and nuisance, see D. Hagman, Urban Planning and Land
Development Control Law §§ 158-62 (1971); McQuillin, supra note 7, § 25.11.
21. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954); see, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Village of
Larchmont, 173 N.Y.L.J., June 18, 1975, at 17, col. 5 (N.Y. Sup. CL) (amendment to zoning
ordinance adopted while petitioner's application for a building permit was pending, which was
designed to exclude petitioner's proposed use, held arbitrary and invalid); Staltac Associates v.
Cohalan, 173 N.Y.L.J., March 28, 1975, at 16, col. 8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (zoning ordinance
prohibiting drive-in and carry-out restaurants held void for vagueness).
22. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 81
(1917).
23. E.g., Frost v. Village of Glen Ellyn, 30 Ill. 2d 241, 245-46, 195 N.E.2d 616, 619 (1964);
Fryer v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 359 Mo. 559, 562-63, 222 S.W.2d 761, 762 (1949) (per
curiam); see Burger King Corp. v. Village of Larchmont, 173 N.Y.L.J., June 18. 1975, at 17, col.
5 (N.Y. Sup. C.).
24. City of St. Paul v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 413 F.2d 762, 767 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 985 (1969); Michaels v. Village of Franklin, 230 N.W.2d 273, 276 (.Mich. App.
1975); Dauernheim, Inc. v. Town Bd., 33 N.Y.2d 468, 472, 310 N.E.2d 516, 518, 354 N.Y.S.2d
909, 913 (1974).
25. Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948); see Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327
(1937), overruled on other grounds, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
26. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 18 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 269 (1974); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S.
513, 525-26 (1958); Comment, Zoning, Aesthetics, and the First Amendment, 64 Colum. L. Rev.
81, 106 (1964). The landmark case of Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), struck down a
statute which imposed a prior restraint upon free speech. The state must carry a heavy burden to
show a compelling or paramount governmental interest. For the Supreme Court's various
characterizations of the quality of the governmental interest which must be shown, see United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).
27. E.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (obscenity); Beauharnais v. Illinois,
343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952) (libel); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 641-45 (1951) (commercial
advertising); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (abusive epithets).
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The courts have resorted to a balancing test when it is alleged that a statute
infringes upon a fundamental right. 28 American Mini Theatres followed the
guidelines enunciated in United States v. O'Brien,29 where the Supreme
Court upheld a conviction for the willful destruction of a Selective Service
registration certificate, burned in protest against the war. When both "speech"
and "nonspeech" elements are combined in the same course of action, a
sufficiently important governmental interest (i.e. the smooth operation of the
selective service system) in regulating the nonspeech element can justify an
incidental limitation upon first amendment freedoms. 30 The Court also has
allowed reasonable "time, place and manner" regulations necessary to further
significant governmental interests, 3' but it has been much more critical of
legislation that prohibited rather than merely regulated expression. 32
The question in American Mini Theatres involved "a city zoning ordinance
which classifies and regulates 'adult' movie theatres and bookstores solely on
the basis of the content of the materials which they purvey. '33 Because the
classification restrained conduct protected by the first amendment, 34 the city
had to bear the heavy burden of showing that the classification was necessary
to the furtherance of a compelling state interest and that its effect on protected
rights was only incidental. 35
Under the O'Brien test3 6 both the majority and dissenting opinions agreed
that the city had the power to license and zone businesses and to prohibit
them from locating within certain areas, and that the city demonstrated its
28. Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1,
91 (1961); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 399-400 (1950).
29. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
30. Id. at 376. "[W]e think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is
within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." Id. at 377.
31. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972) (anti-noise ordinance prohibiting
disturbances in the vicinity of a school building held constitutional); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92, 98 (1972) (ordinance prohibiting all picketing except peaceful labor picketing in the
vicinity of a school held unconstitutional since it made impermissible distinction between peaceful
labor picketing and other peaceful picketing); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941)
(statute requiring license which fixed time and place for parade held constitutional).
32. See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 103-04 (1940) (absolute ban on peaceful
picketing held invalid); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450-51 (1938) (absolute ban on
distribution of literature without first obtaining written permission held invalid). The district
court in American Mini Theatres struck down the ordinance which prohibited the operation of
certain businesses within 500 feet of any dwelling unit and recognized that the effect of such a
prohibition was an almost total ban on such uses. See note 11 supra.
33. 518 F.2d at 1015; see note 4 supra and accompanying text.
34. The materials which the appellants purveyed had not been judicially declared obscene,
518 F.2d at 1019, and the city did not dispute that it was regulating matter presumably protected
by the first amendment. Id. at 1018.
35. Id. at 1019-20.
36. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
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compelling interest in the preservation of its neighborhoods. The disagree-
ment between the majority and the dissent, however, arose over the question
of whether the ordinances "constitute a permissible means of achieving this
end." 37
The majority concluded that the city's interest in preserving its neighbor-
hoods was not" 'unrelated to the suppression of free expression.' "3 It relied
upon Police Department v. Mosley 39 for the proposition that "government has
no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject
matter, or its contents. '4 0 There the city ordinance prohibited all picketing,
except peaceful labor picketing, within 150 feet of any school during class
hours. The Court held that it was impermissible to distinguish between labor
picketing and other peaceful picketing; such a distinction, the Court reasoned,
was based on the subject matter of the activity and was not neutral in regard
to time, place and circumstance. 4 1 In this same context the court in American
Mini Theatres distinguished Grayned v. City of Rockford,42 where an ordi-
nance prohibiting all disruptive noises or diversions near schools during class
time was upheld as a reasonable "time, place and manner" regulation which
was "narrowly tailored to further Rockford's compelling interest . . . and
[which did] not unnecessarily interfere with First Amendment rights."'43
American Mini Theatres declared that the Detroit ordinance was invalid
under the equal protection clause because the ordinance was concerned with,
and intended to control, the content of speech; it selected for special treatment
particular establishments which would not have been affected under the
general zoning provisions of the ordinance and classified them as regulated
uses solely on the basis of the constitutionally protected materials which they
supplied to the public.44 Implicit in the majority's opinion was the belief that
the governmental interest in regulating the conduct at issue arose because the
communication integral to the conduct was considered harmful. 45 The court
did not conclude, however, that the city could not try to prevent the
deterioration of its neighborhoods; in fact it suggested that the city could
require movie theatres and bookstores to operate only in certain areas or
during certain hours.46 But such legislation, the court reasoned, must provide
37. 518 F.2d at 1018.
38. Id. at 1023 (Celebrezze, J., dissenting, characterizing majority opinion).
39. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
40. Id. at 95; see 518 F.2d at 1020.
41. 408 U.S. at 99.
42. 408 U.S. 104 (1972); see 518 F.2d at 1020.
43. 408 U.S. at 119. But the Grayned Court struck down as violative of the equal protection
clause the anti-picketing ordinance which exempted the peaceful picketing of any school involved
in a labor dispute. This ordinance was identical to the ordinance considered in Mosley. Id. at 107.
44. 518 F.2d at 1020-21.
45. Id. at 1018. While there was dispute as to whether actual property values had declined in
areas in which the concentrations were located, still the plaintiffs did not rebut the city's
arguments that the "quality of life" had declined and that the problems connected with the
provision of municipal services had increased due to such concentrations. Id.
46. Id. at 1020. This conclusion indicates a failure to perceive that adult bookstores and
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the equal protection of the law guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.47
While the majority concentrated on the effect of the ordinances upon free
speech, the dissent focused on the effect of the absence of such ordinances
(and thus the presence of concentrations of adult businesses) upon the
neighborhoods. The dissenting judge agreed with the district court that the
ordinance's restriction was
,no greater than is essential to the furtherance of a legitimate governmental interest in
preserving and stabilizing neighborhoods,' and that it imposed only a 'slight' and
'incidental' burden on First Amendment rights. 48
He argued that the city was engaged not in regulating speech on the basis of
its content, but in regulating "the right to locate a business based on the
side-effects of its location. '49
The dissent distinguished Police Department v. Mosley,50 upon which the
majority relied for its conclusion that regulation based on content was
unconstitutional. 1 In Mosley the city's total prohibition, as opposed to mere
regulation, of non-labor-related picketing near schools sought "to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its con-
tent."'52 The dissent in American Mini Theatres argued that the zoning
ordinance at issue was not an absolute ban on adult establishments, but
rather a prohibition on their concentration. 53 The ordinance affected only new
locations and left available numerous locations for the regulated uses, and so
the burden on first amendment rights was slight. The purpose of the regula-
tion, the dissent reasoned, was ndt to censor the "adult" materials, but to
prevent the deterioration of neighborhoods caused by concentrations of the
regulated businesses. 5 4
It is not a control on the basis of content in which the City of Detroit is engaging. It
is, instead, a justifiable distinction in neighborhood impact that underlies the differen-
tial treatment between adult and non-adult businesses. This amply distinguishes our
case from Mosley . . .5
theatres have a clearly different impact upon the surrounding neighborhoods than do non-adult
bookstores and theatres. The criterion for placing adult and non-adult businesses in different
classes is the recognizable side effects of their locations, and this criterion is directly related to the
state's demonstrated compelling interest. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971).
47. 518 F.2d at 1020-21; cf. Colorado Springs Amusements, Ltd. v. Rizzo, No. 75-1107 (3d
Cir., Oct. 16, 1975) (ordinance which prohibited employees of licensed massage parlors from
massaging anyone of the opposite sex held valid).
48. 518 F.2d at 1021 (Celebrezze, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 1023.
50. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
51. The dissent argued that the majority misinterpreted Mosley "to mean that no distinctions
at all may be made between different categories of speech." 518 F.2d at 1023 n.4 (Celebrezze, J.,
dissenting); see text accompanying notes 39-41 supra.
52. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
53. 518 F.2d at 1025 (Celebrezze, J., dissenting).
54. The majority recognized that the important element in determining the validity of
legislation is the effect of the legislation, not its purpose or the motive behind its adoption. Id. at
1019.
55. Id. at 1024 (Celebrezze, J., dissenting).
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The adult enterprises merely were regulated, and not prohibited. The public
still had easy access to, and the publishers still had a convenient outlet for,
adult materials. Thus the incidental restriction on free speech was no greater
than was essential to achieve the city's compelling interest in preserving its
neighborhoods.
The effect of the ordinance, therefore, is to prevent a concentration of adult businesses
in any area of the City but not to stifle the flow of commerce between distributors and
the publicA
6
It is submitted that the dissent convincingly undermined the majority's
reasoning. The majority misconstrued Mosley as an absolute ban on all
regulations based on content. Mosley is clearly distinguishable: it involved an
absolute prohibition on picketing near schools, unless the picketing was
labor-related. Moreover, in Mosley the city was unable to justify the differ-
ences in treatment given labor picketing as opposed to peaceful non-labor
picketing.
In the instant case, the ordinance was a regulation-not a prohibition-of
the location of adult entertainment businesses, which remained free to operate
in numerous places within the city. Freedom of expression was affected only
incidentally. The ordinance was concerned only with new locations, and so at
most, the inconvenience to the public was limited to not having clusters of
such businesses near at hand. The flow of constitutionally protected material
from distributors to the public was hardly slowed; the regulation inherent in
the ordinance principally affected the businessman's economic right to operate
an enterprise wherever he wanted. In fact, a restriction on concentrations of
adult businesses is even less intrusive on personal rights than the zoning
ordinances which totally exclude such commercial uses from residential
areas.5 7 The purpose of the city ordinance was not to restrict expression
because of its content or subject matter, but to control the deterioration of
neighborhoods by restricting the location of businesses which have been
shown to have an adverse effect on the community. 58 Detroit's ordinance was
narrowly tailored, and the incidental restriction on free speech was no greater
than was essential to the furtherance of the compelling governmental interest.
Thomas Neitfeld
56. Id. at 1025. The ordinance also contained a provision whereby "waiver of the limitation
can be obtained upon proof that a business's entry into a neighborhood will not have the effect
the ordinance was designed to prevent." Id. at 1021.
57. Clearly, plaintiffs would be unable to claim that they could lawfully operate a theatre or
bookstore in a residentially zoned area.
58. Speaking about regulation of obscenity one commentator has stated: "The problem is no
different from that raised by the physical environment, or by indecent exposure, by boisterous
drunkenness, rampant prostitution, or public lovemaking .... [TIhe same Supreme Court which
decreed virtually unlimited permissiveness with regard to obscenity has not construed the
Constitution so as to forbid the placing of legal restraints on architectural designs, for example, or
on indecencies of public behavior .... The assigned reason is that the First Amendment throws
special safeguards around speech and other forms of communication, which are relevant to
obscenity, but does not protect conduct. The point is absurd. There is no bright line between
communication and conduct. What is a live sex show--communication or conduct?" A. Bickel,
The Morality of Consent 74 (1975); see id. at 73-75.
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Federal Courts-Federal Common Law Created to Allow Survival ofSection 1983 Action to Decedent's Executor.-In 1967, Jim Garrison,then District Attorney of Orleans Parish, Louisiana, arrested Clay L. Shawfor conspiracy to assassinate President John F. Kennedy. In 1969, Shaw wasacquitted of the charges. On the first working day after the jury verdict,Garrison charged Shaw with two counts of perjury. Shaw sought, and wasgranted, a permanent injunction against Garrison from further prosecution ofthe perjury charges on the grounds that they were initiated in bad faith. 'Shaw then filed a complaint against Garrison and others2 for alleged depriva-tion of civil rights, pursuant to section 1983. 3 In August 1974, three monthsbefore the case came to trial, Shaw died and was not survived by any close
relatives.
The district court permitted the executor of Shaw's will to be substituted asplaintiff, pursuant to rule 25(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.'Defendants objected to the substitution and moved to dismiss the complaintbecause the applicable Louisiana statute provided only for survival actionsmaintained by relatives.5 The court, having examined the Louisiana statutes, 6federal statutory law, 7 and traditional common law, 8 found that the cause ofaction would not survive. Nevertheless, the court held that a federal common
1. Shaw v. Garrison, 328 F. Supp. 390, 399-400 (E.D. La. 1971), affd, 467 F.2d 113 (SthCir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1024 (1972).2. Shaw alleged that defendants Rault, Shilstone and Robertson conspired with Garrison fortheir "personal and political aggrandizement." Shaw v. Garrison, 391 F. Supp. 1353, 1357 (E.D.La. 1975). Shaw also claimed that defendant Dr. Fatter hypnotized defendant Russo, Garrison'skey witness (for the criminal trial), to make him testify against Shaw. Id. at 1358.3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides that. "Every person who, under color of any statute,ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to besubjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to thedeprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall beliable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress."
Shaw also claimed a violation of rights under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(civil action against conspirators who deny to any citizen the equal protection of the laws) &§ 1986 (survival of section 1985 action to a legal representative of deceased, but not in excess of5000 dollars damages) (1970). The court dismissed both claims against defendants because therewas no racial or class-based discrimination and the alleged conspiracy occurred in state, notfederal, court. 391 F. Supp. at 1369-70.4. Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(a)(1) provides in pertinent part: "If a party dies and the claim is notthereby extinguished, the court may order substitution of the proper parties."5. The Louisiana survival statute provides for survival of personal injury actions to onlyparents, spouse, children or siblings of the deceased. La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2315 (West 1971);La. Code Civ. Pro. Ann. art. 428 (West 1960); id. art. 801 (West Supp. 1975).6. 391 F. Supp. at 1361-63. Only suits for damages to property may be inherited by the legalrepresentative. La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2315 (West 197 1). Shaw's executor argued that the actionwas for damages to the estate, but the court was not persuaded. 391 F. Supp. at 1362.7. Upon examination, the court found that "[tihere is no general federal statutory law ofsurvival governing civil rights actions." 391 F. Supp. at 1359.8. "[Tjhe old common law provided that all actions abate upon the death of the parties..."Id. at 1367; see W. Prosser, Torts § 126 (4th ed. 1971).
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law of survival was necessary to effectuate the broad remedial goals of the
federal civil rights laws. The court concluded: "[Flederal common law re-
quires that this pending action survive in favor of the executor of decedent's
last will." 9 Shaw v. Garrison, 391 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. La. 1975).
The mere substitution of a party for the deceased generally is considered
procedural. ' 0 In Hanna v. Plumer,II the Supreme Court held that where state
and federal procedural rules conflict, the state rule will not override the
federal one. The Court reasoned that the Erie principle' 2 requiring the use
of state law in federal courts had no applicability to the validity of a federal
procedural rule.13 In Iovbw v. Waterson, 14 the Second Circuit substituted an
administratrix pursuant to rule 25(a)(1), notwithstanding a contrary state
practice. The court pointed out that:
the only substantive rights here are those created by the Virginia law of torts and
recognized by the New York law of conflict of laws. Hence steps relating to the
enforcement of these rights in New York . . . would be not substantive but
procedural. 15
Since rule 25(a)(1) permitted the substitution of personal representatives of
non-resident decedents, the court held that Congress had the "power to
establish uniform rules ... for the Federal courts 'in all suits of a civil nature'
including those based on diversity of citizenship .... "16 and thus contravene
state law.
However, rule 25(a)(1) would probably not have been held to supersede
state law in Shaw because decisions subsequent to Iovino have held that,
while the method of substitution is procedural, the question of whether any
9. 391 F. Supp. at 1356.
10. "The question of substitution of parties is procedural, recognized by the rules as such, and
not controlled or governed by local law." Jones v. Schellenberger, 196 F.2d 852, 854 (7th Cir.),
cerL denied, 344 U.S. 876 (1952).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are intended to govern the procedure in federal courts. 28
U.S.C. § 2072 (1970) provides in pertinent part: "All laws in conflict with [the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure] shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect." See
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472-73 (1965) (rule 4(d)(l)); Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S.
104, 114 (1964) (rule 35); Sylvestri v. Warner & Swasey Co., 398 F.2d 598, 606 (2d Cir. 1968)
(rule 3).
11. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
12. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see text accompanying note 35 infra.
13. 380 U.S. at 469-70. The Court said: "To hold that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure must
cease to function whenever it alters the mode of enforcing state-created rights would be to
disembowel either the Constitution's grant of power over federal procedure or Congress' attempt
to exercise the power in the Enabling Act." Id. at 473-74.
14. 274 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 949 (1960). In Iovino, the non-resident
defendant died before plaintiffs served their complaint on defendant's attorney. The attorney
accepted service but did not mention defendant's death. Three years later, plaintiffs learned of
the death and moved to substitute the decedent's administratrix as defendant. The New York
statute did not provide for substitution of personal representatives of non-resident decedents.
15. Id. at 46.
16. Id. at 48. The court based its conclusion on Article III and the necessary and proper
clause of the Constitution. Id.
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claim existed after decedent's death is substantive. 17 Even though the court in
Shaw did not address itself to the apparent conflict between rule 25(a)(1) and
the Louisiana survival statutes, it approached the substantive question by
looking to state law which held that a personal injury action such as Shaw's
abated upon death.18
The court began its analysis of whether the action should abate with a
consideration of the federal civil rights statutes, sections 1983 and 1988.19
Section 198820 provides that district courts may use state law in cases brought
under the Civil Rights Acts, if the federal statutory law is deficient in
furnishing suitable remedies. The court, relying principally on the Fifth
Circuit's decision in Brazier v. Cherry,2 1 determined that the failure to
provide for survival in civil rights actions was precisely such a deficiency.22 In
Brazier, a widow was permitted to bring an action for decedent's claims
against various police officers for allegedly beating her husband to death.
Since the federal statutes made no reference to survival, the Fifth Circuit
adopted Georgia state law pursuant to section 1988.23
The court in Shaw faced a different situation, however, because Louisiana
law did not provide for survival of the action. 24 Defendants argued that the
court should adopt the law of the forum state. 25 But the court pointed out
17. Ransom v. Brennan, 437 F.2d 513, 520 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 904 (1971);
Pritchard v. Smith, 289 F.2d 153, 157 (8th Cir. 1961); McManus v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 275 F.
Supp. 361, 364 (E.D. La. 1967); 3B J. Moore, Federal Practice 25.04 (2d ed. 1975).
18. 391 F. Supp. at 1361-63; see Austrum v. City of Baton Rouge, 282 So. 2d 434, 439 (La.
1973); J. Wilton Jones Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 248 So. 2d 878, 891 (La. Ct. App. 1970).
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988 (1970).
20. Section 1988 provides in pertinent part: "The jurisdiction in civil . . . matters conferred
on the district courts . . . for the protection of all persons in the United States in their civil rights,
and for their vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the
United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where
they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable
remedies . . . the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the
State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil . . . cause is held, so far as the same Is
not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and
govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause .... ." Id. § 1988 (1970).
21. 293 F.2d 401 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 921 (1961). Several of the other cases cited
by the Shaw court to illustrate that the lack of survival provisions in federal law was a deficiency
in the civil rights laws also reflected an attempt on the part of the courts to preserve section 1983
actions through the use of section 1988. See Pritchard v. Smith, 289 F.2d 153, 157 (8th Cir. 1961)
(civil rights action for damages survives against administrator of defendant's estate); Holmes v.
Silver Cross Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 125, 129 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (civil rights action for blood
transfusion wrongfully given to decedent survived to his personal representative); Perkins v.
Salafia, 338 F. Supp. 1325, 1327 (D. Conn. 1972) (civil rights action for death of son by gunshot
from state police officers survived to mother as administratrix).
22. 391 F. Supp. at 1358-61.
23. 293 F.2d at 409.
24. 391 F. Supp. at 1363.
25. The court recognized that the defendants' argument was "not without some support in the
case law and in the language of § 1988 itself." Id. at 1365. However, the court concluded that
"this result was not intended by Congress, is not commanded by the holding of any case binding
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that the purpose of section 1988 was to compensate for any deficiency under
the federal civil rights laws.2 6 In cases where state law provided for survival,
the court found that the adoption of state law merely remedied the de-
ficiency. 27 But where, as here, state law provided no remedy, no purpose
would be served in applying it. The court stated:
It is undeniable that federal courts are directed by [section] 1988 to look to state law to
provide relief where the federal statute is deficient. But [section] 1988 nowhere states
that the federal court is bound by an inhospitable state law.28
In support of its conclusion, the court stressed language in section 1988 that
state law was not to be applied if it were inconsistent with the purpose of the
statute.29 The court found the Louisiana practice of permitting survival of the
action only for certain classes of close relatives inconsistent with federal civil
rights laws.30 It concluded, therefore, that "[section] 1988 [was] inapplicable
because the state law [was] not 'suitable to carry the [federal] law into
effect.' ",31 In Brazier, the Fifth Circuit also had addressed the problem:
From a federal standpoint the only limitation upon the use of such adoptive state
legislation, rule or decision is that it is suitable to carry the law into effect because
other available direct federal legislation is not adapted to that object or is deficient in
furnishing a fully effective redress.
32
After determining that section 1988 did not require adoption of state law,
the court in Shaw considered "whether [the] action survive[d] in favor of
decedent's personal representative as a matter of federal common law." 33 In
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 34 Justice Brandeis, writing for the Court,
concluded that "Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or
by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State
on us, and, most importantly, is contrary to the broad remedial purposes underlying the federal
civil rights laws." Id.
26. Id. at 1358-60.
27. Id. at 1360-61.
28. Id. at 1366.
29. "Under the terms of the statute, the state law is 'inconsistent with . . . the laws of the
United States' because such law does not provide for survival necessitated by the policies behind
the civil rights statutes, and thus need not be applied." Id.; see note 20 supra.
30. 391 F. Supp. at 1364. The court noted that every other state in the Union provides that
actions which do not otherwise abate survive to legal representatives. E.g., Cal. Prob. Code
§ 573 (West Supp. 1975); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-599 (1960); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 228, §§ 1,
4 (1974); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:15-3 (Supp. 1975); id. § 2A:15-4 (1952); N.Y. Est., Powers &
Trusts Law § 11-3.2 (McKinney 1967); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 4676 (1952); id. art. 5525
(1958).
31. 391 F. Supp. at 1366; see Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 709-10 (1973)
(Court held section 1988 inapplicable for the purposes of adopting the state cause of action that
provided for municipal liability because it found that Congress intended to exdude such liability
in the civil rights acts). In Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965), the court adopted a federal
common law of damages contrary to the state law by determining that section 1988 was
inapplicable because the federal law was not deficient. Id. at 86.
32. 293 F.2d at 409.
33. 391 F. Supp. at 1365.
34. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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.... There is no federal general common law."' 3" But even on the same day
that Erie was decided, Justice Brandeis wrote another opinion in which he
stated: "[W]hether the water of an interstate stream must be apportioned
between the two States is a question of 'federal common law' upon which
neither the statutes nor the decisions of either State can be conclusive. '36
The original distinction between these two decisions-Erie was a diversity
case while the latter dealt with a federal question-is no longer a clear one,
since the Erie principle has been applied to federal question cases 37 and
federal common law has been used in diversity cases. 38 Nonetheless, whether
or not Erie governs only diversity actions in federal court, federal common
law quite clearly exists, although it may be termed "independent federal
judicial decision, '39 or new, 40 specialized, 4 1 or true national common law. 42
Moreover, the scope of federal common law has expanded. 43
35. Id. at 78; see Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 383, 405-08 (1964).
36. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938).
37. Wichita Royalty Co. v. City Natl Bank, 306 U.S. 103, 106-17 (1939) (Texas law applied
to suit between national bank and Texas bank); Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop,
Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 540-41 n. I (2d Cir. 1956) (trademark infringement); see IA J. Moore, Federal
Practice 0.305[3] (2d ed. 1974); Friendly, In Praise of Eric-and of the New Federal Common
Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 383, 408-09 n.122 (1974).
38. E.g., Francis v. Southern Pac. Co., 333 U.S. 445 (1948) (federal law of negligence
controls wrongful death action based on diversity jurisdiction); Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec.
Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942) (diversity action in which estoppel of licensee was question of federal
law); American Pipe & Steel Corp. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 292 F.2d 640, 643-44 (9th
Cir. 1961) (federal common law governs in diversity action by subcontractor against government
contractor); see Note, The Competence of Federal Courts to Formulate Rules of Decision, 77
Harv. L. Rev. 1084, 1087-88 (1964).
39. "[T]here remains what may be termed, for want of a better label, an area of 'federal
common law' or perhaps more accurately 'law of independent federal judicial decision,' outside
the constitutional realm, untouched by the Erie decision." United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332
U.S. 301, 308 (1947) (whether United States may recover expenses for injured soldier from
tortfeasor is question of federal law).
There is some ambiguity in the use of the term federal common law. See H. Hart & H.
Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System 770 (2d ed. 1973); notes 22-24 infra. For
purposes of this discussion, the term is used in the context of the federal nonstatutory law applied
after Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
40. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rev.
383, 422 (1964); Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1512 (1969).
41. Federal common law may be called specialized in the sense that it is not general. "The
federal courts have no general common law, as in a sense they have no general or comprehensive
jurisprudence of any kind . . . . But this is not to say that wherever we have occasion to decide a
federal question which cannot be answered from federal statutes alone we may not resort to all of
the source materials of the common law, or that when we have fashioned an answer it does not
become a part of the federal non-statutory or common law." D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC,
315 U.S. 447, 469 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted); see Friendly, In Praise of
Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 383, 405 (1964).
42. Keeffe, In Praise of Joseph Story, Swift v. Tyson and "The" True National Common
Law, 18 Am. U.L. Rev. 316 (1969).
43. See, e.g., United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580 (1973) (federal
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The reasons given for the finding of federal common law are varied." The
need for nationwide uniformity is an important consideration in suits between
states.' 5 In areas such as bankruptcy 46 and admiralty, 47 the Constitution has
been held to provide the basis for federal preemption of state law. The federal
courts also created federal common law to interpret certain statutes, 48 to
effect the congressional intent of statutes49 or to protect interests created by
common law governs mineral rights of federal government); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406
U.S. 91 (1972) (federal common law governs interstate pollution); Moragne v. States Marine Lines,
Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970) (federal nonstatutory maritime law permits cause of action for wrongful
death); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) ("act of state" doctrine
recognizing validity of sovereign acts of foreign country is matter of federal law); Textile Workers
v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (federal common law governs collective bargaining
agreements); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (federal common law
controls suits of negotiable instruments issued by United States); Hall v. Wooten, 506 F.2d 564
(6th Cir. 1974) (federal common law permits survival of section 1983 claim); United States v.
Albrecht, 496 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1974) (federal common law governs protection of wildlife
production areas); United States v. Hext, 444 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1971) (federal common law
applied in Farmer's Home Administration loan program); City Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
Crowley, 393 F. Supp. 644 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (federal common law governs internal management
of federal savings and loan associations). See generally H. Hart & H. Wechsler, The Federal
Courts and the Federal System 756-832 (2d ed. 1973); C. Wright, Law of Federal Courts § 60 (2d
ed. 1970); Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1512 (1969).
44. See, e.g., Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Preemp-
tion, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 1024, 1026-30 (1967); Comment, The Invalid Growth of the New
Federal Common Law Dictates the Need for a Second Erie, 9 Houston L. Rev. 329, 347 (1971);
Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1512, 1519-26 (1969); Note, Federal
Common Law and Article TII- A Jurisdictional Approach to Erie, 74 Yale L.J. 325, 327 (1964).
45. Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 678 (1965) (interstate escheat dispute); West Virginia
ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 28-29 (1951) (interstate compact); see Illinois v. City of
Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (interstate pollution); Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660,
670-71 (1931) (apportionment of interstate stream).
46. "Nothing decided in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins... requires a court of bankruptcy to apply
... a local rule governing the liquidation of insolvent estates.... The court of bankruptcy is a
court of equity... and it is for that court-not without appropriate regard for rights acquired
under rules of state law-to define and apply federal law in determining the extent to which the
inequitable conduct of a claimant in acquiring or asserting his claim in bankruptcy requires its
subordination to other claims which, in other respects, are of the same class." Prudence
Realization Corp. v. Geist, 316 U.S. 89, 95 (1942); see Hill, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66
Harv. L. Rev. 1013, 1036-38 (1953).
47. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409-10 (1953); Garrett v. Moore-
McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 244 (1942); Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372, 382
(1918); Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 214-15 (1917).
48. E.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943).
49. E.g., Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957). Into this category
would also fall cases implying federal common law from jurisdictional grants and implying
federal remedies from federal statutes. E.g., Bivens v. Six Unknowvn Named Agents of Fed.
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (federal cause of action against federal officers implied
from fourth amendment); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (federal cause of action for
damages implied from violation of Securities Exchange Act); Ivy Broadcasting Co. v. ATT', 391
F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968) (federal common law provides tort and contract remedies against
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the statutes.5 ° However, the court in Shaw assumed, without discussion, the
existence of federal common law that allowed it to create a right of survival in
civil rights actions.
In order to determine the federal common law, the court in Shaw looked to
civil rights cases where federal courts provided relief even when the federal
statute did not so provide. 5' In Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc.,52 a
homeowner sued for damages under the civil rights statute providing for
equal housing rights. 53 The statute did not provide for damages but the
Supreme Court held that they were a proper remedy. The Court, however,
relied on section 1988 stating that "both federal and state rules on damages
may be utilized, whichever better serves the policies expressed in the federal
statutes."' 4 The Court did not consider the problem that would arise should a
state statute not grant any relief. The other case relied upon by the Shaw
court, Bell v. Hood, 5 can also be distinguished from Shaw. In Bell, plaintiff
sued for damages for violation of his fourth and fifth amendment rights by
federal officers. The Supreme Court held that the district court had jurisdic-
tion over the case although no federal statute specifically provided for
jurisdiction. If the Court had not so held, the suit could probably not have
been brought at all since the state forum would have been inappropriate to
litigate a federal right against federal officers. 56 But in Shaw, the problem
was not whether a cause of action for damages existed but whether such cause
of action survived.
Finally, the court in Shaw found its strongest authority in a unanimous
Supreme Court decision that granted relief in the absence of federal and state
authority. In Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.,5 7 a widow, in a wrongful
death action, charged the shipowners with maintaining an unseaworthy
vessel. Notwithstanding the fact that neither federal maritime law nor Florida
statutes recognized a wrongful death action based on the unseaworthiness of a
ship,58 the Supreme Court found that a cause of action did lie.5 9 As the court
in Moragne found no impediment to the creation of a federal common law of
wrongful death, so the court in Shaw found "no impediment to the creation of
interstate telephone company); Note, Implying Civil Remedies from Federal Regulatory Statutes,
77 Harv. L. Rev. 285 (1963).
50. E.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964).
51. 391 F. Supp. at 1366-67.
52. 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970).
54. 396 U.S. at 240.
55. 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
56. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
390-95 (1971); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 683-84 (1946); Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The
Constitution as a Sword, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1532, 1534-37 (1972).
57. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
58. Id. at 376-77.
59. Id. at 409. In an earlier case, the Supreme Court had held that a wrongful death action
based on negligence did not lie under general maritime law. The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886),
overruled, Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
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a federal common law of survival in civil rights actions in favor of the
personal representative of the deceased. '60
Moragne, however, was a wrongful death action in admiralty, 6  brought by
designated beneficiaries for their pecuniary loss resulting from the death of
another. 62 On the other hand, a survival statute or rule (the question
presented in Shaw) preserves the claims that the decedent had prior to death
but does not create a new cause of action. 63 In Moragne, therefore, the
question was whether the alleged cause of action existed, while in Shaw the
question was whether the alleged cause of action had abated. Moreover, the
law of admiralty reflects a congressional concern for the dependent position of
the seaman. 64 The legislative concern in civil rights acts, however, does not
reflect a concern with such a dependent relationship. 65 Nonetheless, the court
in Shaw found that "Moragne stands for the proposition that creation of..
remedies is not limited to statutory law."166
Thus, it relied upon the broad remedial purposes underlying the federal
civil rights laws to find that a federal common law right of survival could be
created. 67 By creating this remedy, the court may have been filling an in-
terstice in the federal civil rights statutes.68 The plaintiff would otherwise
60. 391 F. Supp. at 1368.
61. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
62. See 2 F. Harper & F. James, Torts § 24.2, at 1285-86 (1956); W. Prosser, Torts § 127, at
902 (4th ed. 1971).
63. See 2 F. Harper & F. James, Torts § 24.2, at 1287 (1956). The court in Shaw recognized
the difference between wrongful death and survival actions while discussing the Louisiana policy
of limiting classes of beneficiaries. 391 F. Supp. at 1364.
64. "The character of seamen and the nature of their employment have induced Congress to
provide specially for the collection of their demands. Seamen have always been considered as
wards of the admiralty." 4 E. Benedict, American Admiralty § 621, at 282 (6th ed. 1940); see
In re Cambria S.S. Co., 505 F.2d 517, 523 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 975 (1975);
Hudspeth v. Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 937, 941 (E.D. La. 1967).
65. The protection afforded by the civil rights acts deals with constitutional rights of United
States citizens, particularly blacks. The distinction in legislative concern between seamen and
blacks is that the former are deemed not able to take care of themselves whereas the latter may
be prevented from doing so because of state action. "It is abundantly dear that one reason the
legislation was passed was to afford a federal right in federal courts because, by reason of
prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the
claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment might be denied by the state agencies." Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,
180 (1961); see McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforcement
of Constitutional Protections, Part I, 60 Va. L. Rev. 1, 2-7 (1974); Nabmod, Section 1983 and the
"Background" of Tort Liability, 50 Ind. L.J. 5, 8 (1974); Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action
in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1486, 1491-95 (1969).
An additional distinction is that federal maritime law applies regardless of state statute. G.
Gilmore & C. Black, Admiralty 48-51 (2d ed. 1975); see, e.g., Roberson v. N.V. Stoomvaart
Maatschappij, 507 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1975) (admiralty suit not dismissed even though substitu-
tion was not effected within the time limitations set forth by the Louisiana surviv-al statute).
66. 391 F. Supp. at 1368.
67. Id.
68. One of the grounds for justifying the creation of federal common law is the fact that
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have been without a remedy. It may be asked, however, whether the remedial
policies of section 1983 are served by allowing survival of the action in this
case. Since Shaw did not have any close relatives, 69 the party compensated
would be far removed from the injured party. Nevertheless, the court was
confronted with a situation where the plaintiff was without a remedy under
both federal and state law. The court's decision may be viewed as a response
to this quandary.
Finally, it is suggested that the court's decision was motivated by what it
considered to be "undoubtedly one of the most bizarre episodes in American
political and legal history."'70 The court noted that "Shaw surely deserves an
opportunity to have his day in court and attempt to clear his name, if only
posthumously."'7 1 Since Louisiana law denied Shaw this opportunity, the
court found that it should not be applied.7 2 Thus, because of this emphasis,
the court's decision may be regarded as unique.
Sylvia Fung Chin
Securities-Second Circuit Clarifies the Extraterritorial Application of
American Securities Laws.-When Congress passed the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934,1 it is doubtful that consideration was given to whether
the protection of the Act was to extend to foreign investors. 2 With the recent
increase of international activity in the securities markets, transactions affect-
ing more than one country have become commonplace. As a result, questions
have arisen as to whether, and to what extent, the securities laws of the
United States should be given extraterritorial application. 3 The following
federal statutory law is by nature incomplete. "Federal law is generally interstitial in its nature. It
rarely occupies a legal field completely, totally excluding all participation by the legal systems of
the states. This was plainly true in the beginning when the federal legislative product (including
the Constitution) was extremely small. It is significantly true today, despite the volume of
Congressional enactments, and even within areas where Congress has been very active. Federal
legislation, on the whole, has been conceived and drafted on an ad hoc basis to accomplish
limited objectives. It builds upon legal relationships established by the states, altering or
supplanting them only so far as necessary for the special purpose. Congress acts, in short, against
the background of the total corpus juris of the states in much the way that a state legislature acts
against the background of the common law, assumed to govern unless changed by legislation." H.
Hart & H. Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System 470-71 (2d ed. 1973).
69. See text accompanying notes 4 & 5 supra.
70. 391 F. Supp. at 1355 (emphasis added).
71. Id. at 1365.
72. Id.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 78a-hh (1970).
2. "The Congress that passed these extraordinary pieces of legislation in the midst of the
depression could hardly have been expected to foresee the development of off-shore funds thirty
years later." Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir. 1975).
3. "Extraterritorial application" is the application of the Act "to persons or events linked with
other countries as well as the United States." H. Steiner & D. Vagts, Transnational Legal
Problems 828 (1968).
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discussion will examine the general principles underlying extraterritorial
applicability particularly in view of two recent decisions in the Second
Circuit, IT v. Vencap, Ltd.,4 and Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc.5
A state has the power to produce legislation governing conduct within its
territory and therefore has jurisdiction over such conduct. 6 Further, unless
intent to the contrary clearly appears, all such legislation is presumed to apply
only within the territory.7 Only in the absence of express statutory language
defining the intended reach of the statute in question should principles of
international law come into play. With the development of modern communi-
cation and transportation facilities, the constituent elements of criminal
conduct may now take place in more than one state. To deal with this
situation, this territorial principle has been expanded by two conversely-
related principles.8
The subjective territorial principle gives a state jurisdiction over conduct
within its territory, whether or not the effects of the conduct are felt within its
boundaries. 9 Thus a state has jurisdiction to prosecute and punish an indi-
vidual for a crime which is commenced within the state but completed beyond
the state's borders. 10 Although previous cases had afforded the opportunity
for using the subjective territorial principle as a basis for applying the
securities laws extraterritorially," Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp.
v. Maxwell12 was the first case to use conduct within the United States as the
basis for asserting jurisdiction over a foreign securities transaction.
The state in which the effect occurs may also assert jurisdiction, based on
the objective territorial principle. This principle gives a state power to
4. 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
5. 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975).
6. Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States §§ 10(a), 17(a) (1965);
Committee on International Law, Report, 21 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 240, 244-45 (1966); Research
in International Law- Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 Am. J. Int'l L. 435, 445, 480-84
(Supp. 1935).
7. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932); see McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional,
372 U.S. 10 (1963).
8. Research in International Law-. Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 Am. J. Int'l L. 435,
484-94 (Supp. 1935).
9. Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 17(a), comment a at
45 (1965); Committee on International Law, Report, 21 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 240, 245 (1966);
Research in International Law- Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 Am. J. Int'! L. 435,
484-87 (Supp. 1935).
10. Research in International Law: Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 Am. J. Intl L.
435, 484 (Supp. 1935).
11. Both Ferraioli v. Cantor, 259 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), and SEC v. Gulf
Intercontinental Fin. Corp., 223 F. Supp. 987 (S.D. Fla. 1963). involved conduct which took
place partly in the United States and partly in a foreign country. In each case the court was of the
opinion that the conduct within the United States, which was inseparable from the foreign
conduct, was the basis for asserting jurisdiction based on the traditional territorial principle. 259
F. Supp. at 846; 223 F. Supp. at 994.
12. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972), discussed in text accompanying notes 33-43 infra.
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regulate conduct outside its territory which produces an effect within it.'3 A
state therefore has jurisdiction to prosecute and punish an individual for a
crime commenced beyond its borders which is consummated within its
territory.1 4 The courts of the United States have traditionally accepted the
objective territorial principle as a legitimate basis for the exercise of jurisdic-
tion. 15
Federal courts in the United States have been influenced by the foregoing
principles of international law in determining whether Congress intended
federal legislation to have extraterritorial application. 16 Congress itself has
provided some guidance on this issue within the statutory framework of the
securities laws. By enacting the 1964 Amendments to the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, it has expanded the application of the registration provisions of
section 12 to include foreign issuers who satisfy certain minimum require-
ments. 17 However, the SEC has promulgated rule 12g3-2 which exempts any
foreign issuer which furnishes the SEC with whatever information the issuer
has made public pursuant to the laws of the country in which it is organized,
incorporated or domiciled.' 8 This rule further provides that furnishing such
information "shall not constitute an admission.., that the issuer is subject to
the [Securities Exchange] Act."' 19
13. Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 18, comment d at
49 (1965) (the Restatement does not use the term "objective territorial'); Committee on Interna-
tional Law, Report, 21 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 240, 245 (1966); Research in International Law:
Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 Am. J. Int'l L. 435, 487-94 (Supp. 1935). See Comment,
The Transnational Reach of Rule 1Ob-5, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1363, 1383-84 (1971), for a discussion
of the need for limiting the type of effect which will be sufficient for jurisdictional purposes.
14. Research in International Law: Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 Am. J. Int'l L.
435, 487-88 (Supp. 1935).
15. Justice Holmes formulated the principle in this way: "Acts done outside a jurisdiction, but
intended to produce and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a State in punishing the
cause of the harm as if he had been present at the effect, if the State should succeed in getting him
within its power." Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911). See United States v. Sisal Sales
Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir.
1945). For one commentator's critical view of the objective territorial principle, see Jennings,
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the United States Antitrust Laws, 33 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 146, 175
(1957). See generally Comment, The Transnational Reach of Rule l0b-5, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1363, 1368-70 (1973); Note, Extraterritorial Application of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
69 Colum. L. Rev. 94, 95-96 (1969).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945):
"[W]e are not to read general words, such as those in this [Sherman] Act, without regard to the
limitations customarily observed by nations upon the exercise of their powers .... Id. at 443.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1970). This section requires every corporate issuer with assets in
excess of one million dollars which is "engaged in interstate commerce, or in a business affecting
interstate commerce, or whose securities are traded by use of the mails or any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce" to register each class of equity security held by more than
500 investors. Id.
18. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2 (1975). This rule also exempts any foreign issuer of a class of
equity securities held by fewer than 300 United States residents.
19. Id. See Mizrack, Recent Developments in the Extraterritorial Application of Section 10(b)
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 30 Bus. Law. 367, 382-83 (1975).
1975] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Although previous courts had been faced with the issue,20 Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook2l was the first case to hold that section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 193422 did have extraterritorial application. In Schoenbaunm,
an American minority shareholder of a Canadian corporation (Banff) whose
stock was traded on the American Stock Exchange brought a shareholder
derivative action, claiming violations of section 10(b) and rule 10b-52
promulgated thereunder. 24
On appeal from a summary judgment entered for the defendants,25 the
Second Circuit affirmed but disagreed with the district court's conclusion that
the Exchange Act had no extraterritorial application. It found that there was
a national public interest in the maintenance of honest and fair securities
markets which was sufficient to rebut "the usual presumption against ex-
traterritorial application of legislation .... -,6. The court went on to state:
We believe that Congress intended the Exchange Act to have extraterritorial applica-
tion in order to protect domestic investors who have purchased foreign securities on
American exchanges and to protect the domestic securities market from the effects of
improper foreign transactions in American securities.2 7
The court cited Justice Holmes' formulation of the objective territorial
principle 28 in support of its ruling that the anti-fraud provision of section
20. The first case to consider the issue of extraterritorial application of the Securities
Exchange Act was Kook v. Crang, 182 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). The court dismissed the
action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction since "[a]ll the essentials of these transactions
occurred without the United States." Id. at 390. It held that " 'jurisdiction' as used in Section
30(b) contemplates some necessary and substantial act within the United States." Id. at 390-91.
The next case to raise the issue was SEC v. Gulf Intercontinental Fin. Corp., 223 F. Supp. 9S7
(S.D. Fla. 1963). The court held that there was subject matter jurisdiction over a fraudulent
scheme since the securities involved had been offered within the United States. Id. at 994-95.
In the first section 10(b) case, Ferraioli v. Cantor, 259 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). the court
avoided the issue of extraterritoriality by finding that the conduct complained of had taken place
within the United States. See generally Comment, The Transnational Reach of Rule 10b-5, 121
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1363 (1973).
21. 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
23. 17 C.F.R- § 240.10b-5 (1975).
24. 405 F.2d at 204. Plaintiff alleged that defendant Aquitaine Company of Canada, Ltd.,
had conspired with Banff's directors to defraud Banff by withholding inside information of a
valuable oil discovery until after Aquitaine had completed a purchase of Banf's treasury shares
at an artificially low market price. Id. at 205.
25. 268 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). The district court held that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction since the Securities Exchange Act was not intended to apply extraterritorially. In any
event, the court concluded, plaintiff had failed to state a cause of action.
26. 405 F.2d at 206. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
27. 405 F.2d at 206. Some courts have held that this statement sets forth the only situations in
which the Exchange Act will be given extraterritorial application. SEC v. Kasser, 391 F. Supp.
1167, 1175 (D.N.J. 1975); Finch v. Marathon Sec. Corp., 316 F. Supp. 1345, 1349 (S.D.N.Y.
1970).
28. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
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10(b) reached beyond the territorial limits of the United States to encompass
fraudulent transactions, the effects of which were "injurious to United States
investors." 29 Forced to confront squarely the question of extraterritoriality,
the court declared that the Act applied to acts outside the United States "at
least when the transactions involve stock registered and listed on a national
securities exchange, and are detrimental to the interests of American inves-
tors. "30
The broad guidelines for the extraterritorial application of the Exchange
Act laid down by the Schoenbaum court 3' were greatly clarified in Leasco
Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell. 32 Plaintiff Leasco, an Ameri-
can corporation, alleged a conspiracy by the defendants to cause Leasco to
purchase the stock of Pergamon Press Ltd. (Pergamon)33 at an inflated price.
According to Leasco, false and misleading oral statements and financial
reports were made to Leasco in meetings in New York and London, as well as
during transatlantic telephone calls between Leasco and defendant Max-
well.
34
The court of appeals conceded that enough had been alleged to show a
violation of rule 10b-5 if section 10(b) could be applied to the transaction in
29. 405 F.2d at 206.
30. Id. at 208-09. The court also ruled that section 30(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (1970),
was not a blanket exemption which precluded the extraterritorial application of the Act to any
foreign transaction. The court held that section 30(b) exempted only those foreign transactions
which were part of a "business in securities." Since the instant situation involved an isolated
foreign transaction not part of a "business in securities," the section 30(b) exemption did not apply
and therefore it did not preclude the extraterritorial application of the Exchange Act. The court
seemed to base its finding on the fact that the transaction was not part of a "business in
securities." 405 F.2d at 207-08. However, in SEC v. United Fin. Group, Inc., 474 F.2d 354 (9th
Cir. 1973), the court cited Schoenbaum as support for its conclusion that "jurisdiction" as used
in section 30(b) did not mean "territorial limits." Id. at 357 n.8.
31. See text accompanying note 27 supra.
32. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
33. Pergamon was a British corporation whose controlling shareholder, Robert Maxwell, a
British citizen, was also a defendant in the instant action. Id. at 1330.
34. Id. at 1330-32. Leasco further alleged that it had signed an agreement in New York with
Maxwell requiring it to offer to acquire the outstanding shares of Pergamon. Id. at 1332. Leasco
expended some $22,000,000 in acquiring 5,206,210 such shares, using cash furnished by Leasco
International N.V., a Netherlands Antilles corporation which was a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Leasco. When it received data indicating that previous misrepresentations had been made,
Leasco declined to proceed with the tender offer. Id. at 1332-33.
The Second Circuit adopted Leasco's version of the facts for the purpose of determining subject
matter jurisdiction. If Leasco was unable at trial to prove the facts alleged, the court stated that
"the principles announced in this opinion should be applied to the proven facts; the issue of
subject matter jurisdiction persists." Id. at 1330.
The court rejected defendant's argument that Leasco lacked standing since it had not actually
purchased the shares. The court, looking to the substance of the transaction rather than its form,
found that "Leasco, the United States company, remained at all times intimately involved in the
transaction; the foreign entity was accepted by both sides as the alter ego of the American." Id. at
1338 (emphasis omitted).
RECENT DE VELOPMENTS
question.3 5 The court distinguished Schoenbaum since in that case "the
fraudulent acts were all committed outside the United States"36 with an
adverse effect on the interests of American investors as a result of a transac-
tion in securities registered and listed on a national securities exchange. The
court refused to extend Schoenbaum's "adverse consequences" rationale to a
case involving foreign securities not traded on an organized national securities
exchange where all the acts occurred abroad. The court stated that "the
language of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act is much too inconclusive to
lead us to believe that Congress meant to impose rules governing conduct
throughout the world in every instance where an American company bought
or sold a security. '37
Having rejected adverse consequences within the United States as a
sufficient basis for subject matter jurisdiction, the court applied the subjective
territorial principle, 38 and noted that, although the black letter of the law
seemed to require that conduct within the territory relate to a thing or status
within the territory,39 a lesser requirement might in some instances be
sufficient.40 The Second Circuit found that the defendant's "abundant misrep-
resentations in the United States,"'4 1 which were "an essential link" in
inducing Leasco to purchase Pergamon's stock on the open market, were
"conduct within the territory" sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the
subjective territorial principle. 42 The fact that the securities were those of a
foreign issuer and were neither registered nor listed on an organized United
States market was not considered fatal.43
Thus, subsequent to Schoenbaum and Leasco, the courts appeared to be
willing to give extraterritorial application to securities laws where the transac-
tion in question produced an adverse effect on American investors or the
domestic securities market, or where there was conduct within the United
States which was an "essential link" in the overall fraudulent scheme.
However, questions remained as to the type of activity required and the
nature of the adverse effect necessary to invoke extraterritorial application. In
35. Id. at 1333.
36. Id. (emphasis in original).
37. Id. at 1334.
38. See notes 9-10 supra and accompanying text.
39. The Pergamon securities, which were the "thing" or "interest" involved here, were traded
in London. 468 F.2d at 1330.
40. Id. at 1334. Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 17,
comment a at 45 (1965), provides that "[a] rule of law prescribed by a state... may deal with the
effects of conduct that occurs in its territory, whether or not such effects take place in its
territory."
illustration 2 to section 17 is illuminating. "X and Y are in state A. X makes a misrepresenta-
tion to Y. X and Y go to state B. Solely because of the prior misrepresentation, Y delivers money
to X. A has jurisdiction to prescribe a criminal penalty for obtaining money by false pretenses."
Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 17 at 45 (1965), quoted in
468 F.2d at 1334 n.3.
41. Id. at 1335.
42. See notes 9, 10, & 38-40 supra and accompanying text.
43. Id. at 1336.
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addition, it was unclear whether foreign nationals would be protected by
American securities laws. These questions have been answered by two recent
decisions in the Second Circuit, fIT v. Vencap, Ltd.,4 4 and Bersch v. Drexel
Firestone, Inc.45
In IT v. Vencap, Ltd., 46 a foreign investment trust (IIT) alleged that it had
been defrauded in the purchase of 30,000 redeemable preference shares of
defendant Vencap, a venture capital firm. The agreement to purchase was
reached after several meetings between defendant Pistell, a United States
citizen residing in the Bahamas, and the president of the corporation respon-
sible for managing HT.47 At Pistell's direction, a memorandum was prepared
outlining the purposes of Vencap. 4 8 Drafts of the memorandum were ex-
changed in New York by the American attorneys for IIT and Vencap. The
agreement was dated September 29, 1972 and the closing occurred in the
Bahamas on October 9.49 Vencap subsequently entered into a series of
transactions which resulted in channeling substantial amounts of Vencap's
funds into Pistell's hands.5 0 Vencap used the New York office of its attorney
as the base for these transactions and maintained its records there. 53
Plaintiffs brought an action in district court for fraud, conversion, and
corporate waste and moved for a preliminary injunction and the appointment
of a receiver. 52 On appeal from an order granting plaintiffs' motion, the
Second Circuit stated that with respect to two possible theories of fraud53
there was activity within the United States which might be sufficient to confer
subject matter jurisdiction. The court stated that it "need[ed] further findings
as to the wickedness of particular transactions and as to whether they were
engineered from the United States" before it could make a final determination
on the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. 54
The court noted that section 22(a) of the Securities Act of 19335" and section
27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 193456 were the only possible bases for
44. 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
45. 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975).
46. 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
47. Id. at 1005.
48. The text of the memorandum is set out in Appendix A to the court's decision. Id. at
1021-24.
49. Id. at 1006-07.
50. Pistell used $600,000 of Vencap's assets as collateral for a personal loan of $590,000.
Vencap was also used to provide financing for certain other companies in which Pistell had an
interest. Id. at 1008-10.
51. Id. at 1018.
52. Id. at 1003-04.
53. The court posited five possible theories of fraud. Id. at 1011-14. The two theories on
which the court found that subject matter jurisdiction might exist were: (1) that Vencap explicitly
represented itself as a bona fide enterprise when in fact it was intended to be used in Pistell's
benefit; (2) that the plaintiffs were bringing a derivative suit on behalf of Vencap for the harm
done to it. Id. at 1013-14, 1018.
54. Id. at 1018.
55. 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1970).
56. Id. § 78aa (1970).
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jurisdiction. 57 It then found that "the perpetration of fraudulent acts them-
selves" within the United States would be sufficient to confer subject matter
jurisdiction over a suit by a defrauded foreign individual,5 8 stating that it did
"not think Congress intended to allow the United States to be used as a base
for manufacturing fraudulent security devices for export, even when these are
peddled only to foreigners."5 9 The court reasoned that since subject matter
jurisdiction existed over a suit by the SEC to enjoin the export from the
United States of securities frauds, 60 there would also be subject matter
jurisdiction when a defrauded foreign individual sued for damages or rescis-
sion.61 The court stated that its ruling was strictly limited to "the perpetration
of fraudulent acts themselves and does not extend to mere preparatory
activities or the failure to prevent fraudulent acts where the bulk of the
activity was performed in foreign countries .... ,62
In reaching its decision, the court indicated that the fact that one of the
defendants was an American citizen was not in itself sufficient to confer
subject matter jurisdiction. Characterizing the problem as one of construing
" 'exercised congressional power, not the limitations upon that power it-
self,' "63 the court indicated that some effect 64 within the United States, in
addition to the defendants United States citizenship, would be necessary for a
finding of subject matter jurisdiction. 6S
57. 519 F.2d at 1015.
58. Id. at 1017-18. A defrauded foreign individual had previously been allowed to recover
damages under rule 10b-5 in a transaction in which the sale of shares of an American corporation
had been effected within the United States. Wandschneider v. Industrial Incomes, Inc. of North
America, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 93,422 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
59. 519 F.2d at 1017.
60. SEC v. United Fin. Group, Inc., 474 F.2d 354, 356-57 (9th Cir. 1973). In this case, the
Ninth Circuit's holding that there was subject matter jurisdiction was based upon defendants!
conduct within the United States and the injury to American investors caused by that conduct.
Although the presence of American investors and the fact that the defendant was an American
corporation were factor's in the court's finding of subject matter jurisdiction, id. at 35S-57, the
Second Circuit was of the opinion that they were not determining factors in the court's decision.
519 F.2d at 1017. Compare SEC v. United Fin. Group, Inc., 474 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1973)
with Investment Properties Int'l, Ltd. v. I.O.S., Ltd., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. 93,011 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (court found subject matter jurisdiction was lacking where
there was no showing of any injury to American investors). But see Comment, The Transnational
Reach of Rule 10b-5, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1363, 1389 (1973) for one commentator's view that the
nationality of the defendants was a critical factor in the court's decision in United Financial.
61. 519 F.2d at 1017-18.
62. Id. at 1018. In F.O.F. Proprietary Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Young & Co., [Current Binder]
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 95,296, at 98,517 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), the court dismissed an action by a
defrauded foreign corporation since the fraudulent conduct causing plaintiff's losses occurred
abroad; the defendant's conduct in the United States consisted of acts in preparation of the fraud.
63. 519 F.2d at 1016, quoting Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 283 (1952).
64. 519 F.2d at 1016. See F.O.F. Proprietary Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Young & Co., [Current
Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 95,296, at 98,517 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
65. The court also rejected the contention that the transaction had a significant effect in the
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In Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 66 an American citizen brought a class
action suit on behalf of thousands of plaintiffs who had subscribed to a public
offering of shares of IOS Ltd. Although there were three separate offerings,
characterized by the plaintiff as the "IOS Public Offering," the shares were
sold under one basic prospectus. The prospectus stated that the shares had
not been offered in the United States and had not been registered under
United States securities laws.61 However, sales totaling 41,936 shares were
made to twenty-two American residents who were all connected in some way
with IOS or its affiliates. In addition, there were numerous meetings in New
York involving the major underwriters in the Drexel Group, 68 their lawyers
and accountants, and representatives of IOS.6 9 Plaintiff alleged antifraud
violations by the underwriters in impliedly representing IOS as a "suitable
company for public ownership" when they should have known that such was
not the case.
The district court ruled that the three offerings could be considered as one
for the purpose of determining jurisdiction, 70 and then proceeded to find
subject matter jurisdiction, based on the amount of activity in the United
States, sales to Americans, and the generalized adverse effects upon the
American securities market.71
On appeal, the Second Circuit noted that, even with the absence of certain
jurisdictional elements72 which had been present in Schoenbaum and Leasco,
from the standpoint of international law, the activities within the United
States 7" were sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction based on the
subjective territorial principle. 74 However, the court was unsure whether it
United States because United States citizens and residents were fundholders in IOS. Noting that
the alleged fraud had been practiced on the trust in which Americans had invested rather than on
the individual Americans themselves, the court concluded that the American interests involved
were too mathematically insignificant to find "adverse effects" similar to those which had
influenced the decision in Schoenbaun. The court found that the losses suffered on the $3,000,000
investment in Vencap by American investors who owned a mere 0.5% of IIT did not satify the
"substantial effect" within the territory requirement of section 18 of the Restatement (Second) of
Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1965), on which Schoenbaum was implicitly based.
519 F.2d at 1017. See notes 13, 14 & 27-30 supra and accompanying text.
66. 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975).
67. Id. at 980-81.
68. The chief underwriters for the IOS Public Offering, consisting of two American banking
houses and four foreign underwriting houses, were collectively referred to as the Drexel Group.
Id. at 979.
69. Id. at 985 n.24.
70. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 389 F. Supp., 446, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 519
F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975).
71. Id. at 455-58.
72. In Schoenbaum, the shares had been registered and listed on a national securities
exchange, 405 F.2d at 204, whereas such registration and listing were absent in Bersch, 519 F.2d
at 980-81. In Leasco, a substantial part of the misrepresentations had been made in the United
States, 468 F.2d at 1335, while in this case there were no fraudulent misrepresentations made in
the United States, 519 F.2d at 987.
73. 519 F.2d at 985 n.24.
74. See id. at 985; notes 9-10 supra and accompanying text.
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should exercise its jurisdictional power, questioning "whether Congress would
have wished the precious resources of United States courts and law enforce-
ment agencies to be devoted to [predominantly foreign transactions] rather
than leave the problem to foreign countries." 75
The court concluded that, since the allegedly false and misleading pro-
spectus emanated from a foreign source, there were no misrepresentations
within the United States upon which the court could base jurisdiction.76 Thus
the instant situation did not fall within the ambit of Leasco. 7 7 The court also
ruled that by itself, an adverse effect on the American economy or American
investors generally would not constitute sufficient grounds for asserting juris-
diction based on the objective territorial principle. 78 Noting that the applica-
tion of the antifraud provisions was limited to acts in connection with the
offer, purchase, or sale of any security, 79 the court concluded that "there is
subject matter jurisdiction of fraudulent acts relating to securities which are
committed abroad only when these result in injury to purchasers or sellers of
those securities in whom the United States has an interest . . .,,1
The court, seemingly basing its decision on the objective territorial princi-
ple, concluded that there was subject matter jurisdiction over sales to those
Americans residing in the United States.8 1 It noted that, since there had been
a direct effect in the United States, conduct within the country would not be
required. The relevant inquiry thus became whether the acts of the defen-
dants had been essential to producing that effect.82
With respect to those American purchasers residing abroad, the court held
that subject matter jurisdiction existed based on the defendants' activities
within the United States. 8 3 It focused on the decision-making quality of
75. 519 F.2d at 985.
76. Id. at 987. The court refused to extend its holding in IIT to protect the foreign
plaintiffs in Bersch. It distinguished IIT on the grounds that that case involved named foreign
plaintiffs and the fraudulent acts themselves had been committed in the United States whereas
the instant case involved thousands of unnamed foreign plaintiffs and activities within the United
States that were merely preparatory. The court also noted that the United States activities were
"relatively small in comparison to those abroad." Id. However, the court implied that the
activities in the United States would be a sufficient basis for asserting jurisdiction over a damage
suit by foreign plaintiffs if the issuer had been a company clearly identified with the United
States. Id. at 986-87.
The court also concluded that retaining the state law claims of the foreign purchasers under a
theory of pendent jurisdiction would be an abuse of discretion. "In terms of the amount at stake it
is almost ludicrous to speak of the claims of the foreign purchasers as 'pendent.' " Id. at 996,
citing UMVW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-27 (1966).
77. See notes 38-43 supra and accompanying text.
78. 519 F.2d at 988-89. See notes 13-14 supra and accompanying text.
79. 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1970) (limited to acts in the "offer or sale of any securities"); id. § 78j(b)
(1970) (limited to acts "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security").
80. 519 F.2d at 989 (footnote omitted).
81. Id. at 991. See notes 13-14 supra and accompanying text.
82. 519 F.2d at 991. The court concluded that the defendants' activities could be
considered essential to producing the effect within the United States. It noted that this conclusion
could be disproved at trial and the issue of subject matter jurisdiction would persist. Id. at 991-
92, citing Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1330 (2d Cir. 1972).
83. 519 F.2d at 992; see id. at 985. n.24.
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defendants' activities rather than on the quantity of physical acts. The court
made it clear that the activities in the United States were a crucial element in
its finding, stating that "Congress surely did not mean the securities laws to
protect the many thousands of Americans residing in foreign countries against
securities frauds by foreigners acting there .... *"84 The court noted that
subject matter jurisdiction would be lacking if the defendants had not
engaged in significant activities within the United States. It also indicated that
the quality of activity required to trigger application of the securities laws
would vary depending upon whether the injured party was an American
residing abroad or a foreigner.8 5
Prior to the Second Circuit's decisions in lIT and Bersch, a court would
consider three jurisdictional elements in determining the extraterritorial appli-
cation of the securities laws--"(1) registration and listing, (2) conduct within
the United States, and (3) adverse impact on a protected U.S. interest. '86 The
protection of American investors and American securities markets was the
prime reason for giving the securities laws extraterritorial application.87
The Second Circuit's decisions in lIT and Bersch have eliminated regis-
tration and listing on a national securities exchange as a necessary jurisdic-
tional element 8 and have extended the extraterritorial application of the
securities laws in order to protect foreign investors and American citizens
residing abroad. Simultaneously, the court has been careful to limit this
extension by narrowing the scope of the "conduct" and "adverse impact"
which will suffice to confer subject matter jurisdiction over a predominantly
foreign transaction.8 9
In determining whether there is subject matter jurisdiction, a court will
now consider the nationality and location of the injured party, the location
and quality of the activity involved, and the adverse effect on the particular
party or interest involved. 90
84. Id. at 992. The court indicated that the participation of an American citizen In the
foreign activities would not of itself change its conclusion. Id. This view is more explicitly stated
in 519 F.2d at 1016.
85. 519 F.2d at 992. While preparatory acitivities within the United States would be a
sufficient basis for jurisdiction when the injured party was an American residing abroad, such
activities would not be sufficient if the injured party were a foreigner. A foreign plaintiff would
be required to show that the conduct in the United States was the direct cause of his injury. Id. at
992-93; F.O.F. Proprietary Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Young & Co., [Current Binder] CCH Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. 95,296, at 98,517 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
86. Mizrack, Recent Developments in the Extraterritorial Application of Section 10(b) of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 30 Bus. Law. 367, 379 (1975). See generally Comment, The
Transnational Reach of Rule 10b-5, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1363 (1973).
87. E.g., Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 405
F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969). See notes 27-30 supra and
accompanying text.
88. See notes 96-98 infra and accompanying text.
89. See notes 60 & 78-80 supra and accompanying text.
90. See Mizrack, Recent Developments in the Extraterritorial Application of Section 10(b) of
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 30 Bus. Law. 367, 377-79 (1975). The recent Supreme
Court decision in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974), created the implication that
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When a named foreign plaintiff is involved, the fraudulent activity must
take place within the United States and be the direct cause of the damage
suffered by the plaintiff in order for subject matter jurisdiction to exist. 9t The
quality of the activity9 2 within the United States will be examined to ensure
that it consists of the actual perpetration of the fraud and is not merely
activity of a preparatory nature. 93
Where an American citizen is involved, his place of residence will help to
determine the extent to which the securities laws will protect him. If the
American citizen is residing abroad, he must show that there were acts of
"material importance" committed within the United States which significantly
contributed to his injury.94 An American citizen resident in the United States
need only show that he has been adversely affected by fraudulent securities
activities conducted abroad in order for the securities laws to be given
extraterritorial application.9"
By eliminating registration and listing as a jurisdictional element, 96 the
court has significantly broadened the protection afforded the American inves-
tor 97 in the Schoenbaum-type situation. Registration and listing on a national
an arbitration clause in an international contract may be a fourth factor in the future. Id. at
512-15. For a comprehensive treatment of arbitration clauses in an international business context
see Note, Arbitration and Forum Selection Clauses in International Business: The Supreme Court
Takes an Internationalist View, 43 Fordham L. Rev. 424 (1974).
91. 519 F.2d at 974. See F.O.F. Proprietary Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Young & Co., (Current
Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 95,296, at 98,517 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Wandschneider v.
Industrial Incomes Inc., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 93,422 (S.D.N.Y.
1972), discussed at note 58 supra.
92. See SEC v. United Fin. Group, Inc., 474 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1973), discussed at note 60
supra. The fact that the offshore mutual funds involved were "directed and controlled as an
integrated whole from the United States" was one factor in the court's finding of subject matter
jurisdiction. Id. at 356.
93. See F.O.F. Proprietary Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Young & Co., [Current Binder] CCH Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. 95,296 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Compare SEC v. Kasser, 391 F. Supp. 1167 (D.N.J.
1975) (use of means of interstate commerce and other miscellaneous activities within the United
States not sufficient to confer jurisdiction over an essentially foreign transaction) vith Travis v.
Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973), rev'g 331 F. Supp. 797 (E.D. Mo. 1971) (use
of mails and other facilities of interstate commerce sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction
since they were essential to the scheme to defraud plaintiffs).
94. 519 F.2d at 993.
95. Id. at 991, 993. The foreign conduct must of course satisfy the jurisdictional requisites
of section 10(b)---"use of the mails or other facilities of interstate commerce." See Mizrack, Recent
Developments in the Extraterritorial Application of Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934, 30 Bus. Law. 367, 371 (1975).
96. Garner v. Pearson, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 94,549 (,LD.
Fla. 1974), had previously indicated the diminishing significance of registration and listing as a
jurisdictional element. The court indicated that the fact that the securities involved in that case
were neither registered nor listed on a national securities exchange would not preclude the
assertion of jurisdiction in an appropriate case. Id. at 95,904. However, since Garner involved
conduct in the United States, it appeared that registration and listing were still factors in a
Schoenbaum-type case.
97. Registration and listing were not considered jurisdictional elements where foreign nation-
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securities exchange had previously been considered an important factor in
determining the extraterritorial application of the securities laws, particularly
in those situations where the allegedly fraudulent conduct took place outside
the United States.9 8 Thus, subject matter jurisdiction will exist over acts
committed abroad only when those acts have adversely affected a specific
purchaser or seller whom the United States has an interest in protecting.9"
Where there has been activity within the United States that has adversely
affected foreigners, that activity must be assessed to determine whether it was
a material part of the fraudulent scheme or merely preparatory to a fraudulent
scheme. 100 For subject matter jurisdiction to exist in such a case, there must
be a showing that the activity within the United States directly caused the
losses suffered by the foreign parties. 10
The Second Circuit's decisions in Bersch and lIT are positive steps forward
in defining the guidelines for the extraterritorial application of securities laws.
By requiring that a specifically protected United States interest be adversely
affected, the new guideline will help ensure that the resources of the United
States courts are not expended on transactions which could more properly be
handled by the courts of the foreign country in which the transaction took
place.' 0 2 In extending protection to foreigners who have been victimized by
fraudulent securities schemes concocted in the United States and exported
abroad, the court has taken a giant step to ensure that United States
corporations have continued free access to foreign capital markets. This
als were involved since the SEC "has traditionally taken the position that the registration
requirements . . . are primarily intended to protect American investors." SEC Release Nos.
33-4708 and 34-7366 (July 9, 1964), 17 C.F.R. § 231.4708 (1975), 1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1362.
98. E.g., Mizrack, Recent Developments in the Extraterritorial Application of Section 10(b)
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 30 Bus. Law. 367, 382-84 (1975). See text
accompanying note 30 supra.
99. 519 F.2d at 989, 991. For jurisdiction to exist, there must be injury to a specific
purchaser or seller of securities in whom the United States has an interest. A generalized adverse
effect on American investors or the American economy will not be a sufficient basis for
jurisdiction. Id. at 989. See SEC v. Kasser, 391 F. Supp. 1167 (D.N.J. 1975) (subject matter
jurisdiction lacking since fraudulent Canadian transaction had no impact on domestic investors or
securities markets); Manus v. Bank of Bermuda, Ltd., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. 9 93,299 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (subject matter jurisdiction lacking since transaction
occurring abroad was not detrimental to any interest protected by the Securities Exchange Act);
Investment Properties Intl, Ltd. v. I.O.S., Ltd., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. 93,011 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (subject matter jurisdiction lacking since no showing of any Injury
to American investors).
100. See 519 F.2d at 1017-18.
101. 519 F.2d at 993; F.O.F. Proprietary Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Young & Co., [Current
Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 95,296 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
102. 519 F.2d at 996-97. As Judge Frankel noted, when there is no impact on such a
protected interest the "United States courts have no reason to become involved, and compelling
reason not to become involved, in the burdens of enforcement and the delicate problems of
foreign relations and international economic policy that extraterritorial application may entail."
Investment Properties Intl, Ltd. v. I.O.S., Ltd., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. 93,011 at 90,735 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (emphasis omitted).
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extension of protection will also help to promote good will within the
international community. 10 3
On the negative side, however, the Second Circuit has failed to provide
adequate guidelines for distinguishing "mere preparatory activities" from
"acts of material importance."' 1 4 Since in the future this distinction may
prove to be crucial in determining whether securities laws will be given
extraterritorial application, a clear demarcation should have been drawn. It is
to be hoped that the Second Circuit will avail itself of the next opportunity to
provide these guidelines, 105 so that parties to international securities transac-
tions will be able to act with even more certainty as to the potential effects of
their activities.
Kevin Pacenta
Taxation-Corporate Reorganization-Withdrawable Shares of Savings
and Loan Association Held To Be Debt Securities.-In January of 1956,
Home Savings and Loan Association purchased for $8,031,107 in cash all the
outstanding guarantee stock' of Pasadena Savings and Loan Association, and
in March of that year, Pasadena was merged into Home. Both associations
had raised capital through the sale of guarantee stock and both had issued
withdrawable shares to evidence their depositors' savings accounts . As was
then required by California law, the merger was approved by the stockholders
103. See generally Comment, The Transnational Reach of Rule l0b-S, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1363, 1397, 1402 (1973), for a discussion of American and international interests which the courts
should seek to promote.
104. In both UT and Bersch, the factual issues had not yet been resolved at trial. Thus in
IIT, the court stated that "we need further findings as to the wickedness of particular
transactions and as to whether they were engineered from the United States." 519 F.2d at
1018. Similarly the court in Bersch stated: 'IT]he question of how far the alleged defrauding of
American citizens abroad resulted from acts . . . in the United States had best be left for
development at a trial." 519 F.2d at 992-93. In the absence of such factual findings, it is
impossible to do anything more than speculate about precisely how the court distinguished
between "acts of material importance" and "mere preparatory activities."
105. See ALI Fed. Sec. Code § 1604 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1974), and Loss and Blackstone,
Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 28 Bus. Law. 381 (1973) for two examples of
proposed guidelines for the extraterritorial application of the securities laws.
1. A California savings and loan association may issue guarantee stock, the proceeds from the
sale of which "shall be set aside ... [and] shall be maintained as a fixed and permanent capital of
the association." Cal. Fin. Code § 6456.1 (West Supp. 1975).
2. See id. §§ 5067, 6501 (West 1968). The total guarantee stock issue of Pasadena was
20,000 shares, and 650,252 withdrawable shares were held by Pasadena depositors prior to the
merger. These shares represented $65,025,200 on deposit. Home Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United
States, 73-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9609, at 81,959 (C.D. Cal. 1973), rev'd, 514 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir.
1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3150 (U.S. Sept. 23, 1975) (No. 75-396). Home had
outstanding at that time 672 shares of guarantee stock and its depositors held 2,266,660
withdrawable shares. 514 F.2d at 1203.
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and the shareholders of both associations.3 The stock of Pasadena (held by
Home) was then surrendered and cancelled and more than 95% of Pasadena's
withdrawable shares were exchanged for withdrawable shares in Home
representing the same amounts on deposit.
Upon completion of the merger, Home acquired $5,281,452.87 in bad debt
reserves which Pasadena had accumulated since 1952. 4 In acquiring these
reserves, Home had assumed that the transaction qualified as a corporate
reorganization, 5 and in such a case the surviving party to the reorganization
continues to use the accounting methods of the distributing corporation. 6 Bad
debt reserves7 established by the transferor may thus be carried over, un-
taxed, by the transferee.
In 1962 the Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued a Notice of De-
ficiency to Home, restoring these funds to income for the year 1956. Home
obtained a judgment for refund of the taxes it had paid pursuant to the
notice,8 but the Ninth Circuit reversed, upholding the position of the Com-
missioner. The Court held that since the withdrawable shares of both
associations were debt securities the continuity of interest test had not been
met, and therefore the transaction could not qualify as a corporate reorganiza-
tion. Home Savings & Loan Association v. United States, 514 F.2d 1199 (9th
3. Ch. 269, § 2.06, [1931] Cal. Stats. 489, as amended Cal, Fin. Code § 9200 (West Supp.
1975). The amended version does not require such consent of the shareholders where an
association issues both stock and shares.
4. Pasadena had eliminated its income tax liability for the years 1952-56 by claiming bad debt
deductions in the amount of its total income. 514 F.2d at 1205; see Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 593
which authorizes such deductions.
5. See note 9 infra for a discussion of the six types of reorganization set forth in Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, § 368(a)(1). The transactions described in these provisions are accorded special tax
treatment as compared, for example, with an outright sale of property. This is based on the
theory that the old corporation continues unliquidated and thus no taxable event has occurred.
The reorganization provisions are intended to defer recognition of gain or loss sustained through
these "merely formal" changes in corporate structure. However, the practical effect of these
technically complex rules has been to focus attention more on the form of the transaction than on
its substance. See generally B. Bittker & J. Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations
and Shareholders, 14.01 (3d ed. 1971) [herdnafter cited as Bittker & Eustice].
6. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 381(c)(4). The term "accounting methods" as used in this section
comprises bad debt reserves. See Treas. Reg. § 1.381(c)(4)-1(b)(1) (1964); Bittker & Eustice, supra
note 5, 16.13 at 16-23.
7. A taxpayer may deduct from taxable income "any debt which becomes worthless within
the taxable year." Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 166(a)(1). The Code also permits, in appropriate
cases, the establishment by the taxpayer of a reserve to cover that percentage of debts which are
likely to become worthless. The amounts allocated to this reserve are deducted from taxable
income. Id. § 166(c). Generally, determinations of the appropriateness of such a reserve, and of
the reasonableness of the amounts set aside, are made by "the Secretary (of the Treasury] or his
delegate" (i.e. the Internal Revenue Service). Id. The Code also regulates the size of bad debt
reserves of savings and loan associations. Id. § 593.
8. Home Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 73-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9609 (C.D. Cal. 1973),
rev'd, 514 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3150 (U.S. Sept. 23,
1975) (No. 75-396).
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Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3150 (U.S. Sept. 23, 1975)
(No. 75-396).
To qualify for Type A9 reorganization treatment, a transaction must not
only qualify as a "statutory merger" under state law,10 but must also meet the
judicially created continuity of interest test." This test requires that "the
transferor corporation or its shareholders [retain]... a substantial proprietary
stake in the enterprise represented by a material interest in the affairs of the
transferee .... ,,"2 This requirement is satisfied when at least half of the
former owners of the transferor corporation receive an equity interest in the
transferee corporation, the value of which represents at least 50% of the total
consideration paid to the transferor. 13 To decide whether this requirement
has been met in cases such as Home, the equity holders of the transferor
corporation must first be identified. Here, if the guarantee stockholders of
Pasadena were its only proprietors, there could be no continuity of interest
since they were paid cash and retained no interest in the transferee. 14 But if
the withdrawable shareholders of Pasadena had been holders of a proprietary
interest, then, if they had also received a stock interest in Home, the
9. There are six types of corporate reorganizations, known as types A through F after Int.
Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 368(a)(1)(A)-(F). In a case such as Home, if the transaction is to be treated
as a reorganization, it must be Type A. Types B and C require that the transferee acquire stock
or property of the transferor "in exchange solely for. . . its voting stock." The transferee in these
types cannot have purchased any interest in the transferor with cash. Id. § 368(a)(1)(B)-(C). Type
D requires that "the transferor or ... its shareholders" be in control of the transferee immediately
after the transaction. Id. § 368(a)(1XD). A Type E recapitalization involves a readjusment of the
"stocks, bonds or other securities of [an existing] corporation . .. as to amount, income or
priority .... " United Gas Improv. Co. v. Commissioner, 142 F.2d 216, 218 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 323 U.S. 739 (1944); see Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 368(a)(l)(E). A Type F reorganization
is "a mere change in identity, form, or place of organization. . . ." Id. § 369(a(l)(F).
10. Roebling v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 810, 812 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 773 (1944);
W.H. Truschel, 29 T.C. 433, 438 (1957).
11. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.368-1(b) to -1(c) (1960); Bittker & Eustice, supra note 5, 14.11; see
LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415, 418 (1940); Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co., 296 U.S. 378,
384-85 (1935); Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462, 470 (1933).
12. Southwest Natural Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 332, 334 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 860 (1951).
13. Schweitzer & Conrad, Inc., 41 B.T.A. 533, 539, 541-42 (1940); Rev. Rul. 224, 1966-2
Cum. Bull. 114.
14. But see Helvering v. Alabama Asphaltic Limestone Co., 315 U.S. 179, 183 (1942), which
held that there was sufficient continuity of interest even though only creditors of the transferor
received stock interests in the transferee. If the withdrawable shares of Home are considered a
stock interest, it might be argued on the basis of the Alabama Asphaltic case that the transaction
qualified as a reorganization even though Pasadena's shares were held to be debt. In Alabama
Asphaltic, however, the transferor corporation was insolvent and its creditors had taken steps to
enforce their claims. The Court held that they had already "stepped into the shoes of the old
stockholders," who had been excluded from the reorganization due to the insolvency. Id. at 184.
The cases which have followed Alabama Asphaltic have repeated this pattern. See, eg.. Western
Mass. Theatres, Inc. v. Commissioner, 236 F.2d 186 (1st Cir. 1956); Norman Scott, Inc., 48 T.C.
598 (1967).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44
continuity of interest test would have been met since a large majority of the
former owners of the transferor would also be equity holders of the transferee.
The Ninth Circuit in Home held the withdrawable shares of both associa-
tions to be debt securities, thereby precluding reorganization treatment. 15
Such a holding also means that the merger has been viewed as the complete
liquidation by Home of a corporation which had become its subsidiary. 16 In
such liquidations, the transferor's bad debt reserves are carried over by the
transferee,' 7 just as in a reorganization. However, such carry-over is not
allowed when as in Home the corporation being liquidated has become a
subsidiary through the parent's purchase of most of its outstanding stock
within twelve months of the liquidation. ' 8 Thus the court's determination that
Pasadena's withdrawable shares were debt securities, and its classification of
the merger as a two-step purchase by Home of Pasadena's assets, required the
restoration of the bad debt reserves to taxable income. 19
The issue of whether a given corporate interest is debt or equity has
15. Home Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 514 F.2d 1199, 1206-08 (9th Cir. 1975),
petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3150 (U.S. Sept. 23, 1975) (No. 75-396). The Home case also
involved the merger of a third savings and loan association into Home. This association issued
investment certificates to its depositors instead of withdrawable shares. Since these certificates
possess fewer equity characteristics than do shares, the decision by the Ninth Circuit that
shareholders are creditors and not stockholders led to a similar characterization of certificate
holders. The court also agreed with the Commissioner that earned but not collected income of the
two transferring institutions should be restored as taxable income to Home. Id. at 1206.
16. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 332(b)(I)-(2).
17. Id. §§ 381(a)(1), (c)(4).
18. Id. § 381(a)(1). Section 381 allows such carry-over when there has been a reorganization
or a liquidation of a long-owned subsidiary on the theory that in both cases only the form of the
corporate enterprise has been changed. See note 5 supra. The latter case can be distinguished
from the liquidation of a recently purchased subsidiary which is, in essence, a two-step purchase
of the subsidiary's assets. Thus no carry-over is allowed when "at least 80% of the total combined
voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote . .'. [is] acquired by the distributce by
purchase . . . during a 12-month period . . . ." Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 334(b)(2); Argus, Inc.,
45 T.C. 63, 68-71 (1965). But see Home Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 223 F. Supp. 134
(S.D. Cal. 1963), where on facts very similar to those in the Ninth Circuit Home case, the court
stated in dictum that the bad debt reserves would carry-over even if it had not decided that
withdrawable shares were equity. Id. at 135-36. The court did not discuss sections 334(b)(2) and
381(a)(1) even though they would seem to be applicable since all the guarantee stock of the
transferee had been purchased for cash a month before the merger was completed.
19. When there is no carry-over, it is generally held that reserves must be returned to the
taxable income of the distributing corporation. Arcadia Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Commissioner, 300
F.2d 247, 250-51 (9th Cir. 1962); Rev. Rul. 258, 1965-2 Cum. Bull. 94; see Bittker & Eustice,
supra note 5, $ 11.62 at 11-51 to -52, 11.65 at 11-70; cf. West Seattle Nat'l Bank v.
Commissioner, 288 F.2d 47, 49-50 (9th Cir. 1961). This is based on the theory that the transferor
"received a tax benefit when its... net income escaped taxation upon being added to its reserves
for bad debts and that the need for such reserves ceased following the sale of its business .... "
300 F.2d at 251. But cf. Nash v. United States, 398 U.S. 1 (1970). There, the restoration of bad
debt reserves to income was not required where the members of a partnership chose to
incorporate their business. It has been suggested that this decision may encourage taxpayers to
relitigate this issue in the liquidation context. Bittker & Eustice, supra note 5, V 11.65 at 11-70.
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frequently been litigated by the Internal Revenue Service and corporate
taxpayers.2 0 In most cases, however, the corporation is seeking a debt
classification l so that the return it pays on the investment will be a deduct-
ible interest payment22 rather than a non-deductible dividend.2 3 Many corpo-
rations, in deciding the form their securities should take, are attracted by the
favorable tax consequences of debt, but are also "fear[ful] of [the] adverse
effects [of heavy debt financing] on their general credit and on their solvency
in hard times."2 4 The result is often the creation of a hybrid security, a
" 'security device' which is in truth neither stock nor bond, but the half-breed
offspring of both."'2 5
Congress has never defined the terms "stock" and "indebtedness,"2 6 the
Internal Revenue Service has refused to issue advance opinions in the area2 7
and no consistent criteria for classifying hybrid interests have emerged from
the myriad court decisions.28 The factors courts have most often considered
important to debt status are: (1) an unconditional obligation to repay a 'sum
certain' at a specified time, (2) an obligation to pay a fixed rate of interest, 9
and (3) priority over stockholders in receiving repayment in the event of
liquidation. 30 Other factors which various courts have considered relevant
include the existence of voting rights, whether the corporation is thinly
capitalized, 31 and the extent to which stockholders of the corporation hold the
20. See generally Plumb, The Federal Income Tax Significance of Corporate Debt: A Critical
Analysis and a Proposal, 26 Tax L. Rev. 369 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Plumb].
21. See id. at 372-74; Stone, Debt-Equity Distinctions in the Tax Treatment of the
Corporation and Its Shareholders, 42 Tul. L. Rev. 251, 252 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Stone].
22. InL Rev. Code of 1954, § 163(a). Savings and loan associations have not had to seek a
debt classification for their withdrawable shares since the Code provides that "[iln the case of...
savings and loan or similar associations... there shall be allowed as deductions in computing
taxable income amounts paid to. . . depositors or holders of accounts as dividends or interest on
their deposits or withdrawable accounts, if such amounts . . . are withdrawable on demand
subject only to customary notice of intention to withdraw." Id. § S91.
23. Id. § 301(c)(1).
24. Plumb, supra note 20, at 405.
25. John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521, 535 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
26. Plumb, supra note 20, at 369; see Stone, supra note 21, at 253.
27. See Rev. Proc. 6, 1960-1 Cum. Bull. 880, which cites the "inherently factual nature of the
problems .... " The adoption of this procedure may have stemmed from the conclusion of the
Supreme Court in John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521, 526-27 (1946), that the
debt-equity question is one of fact to be determined by the trial court in each case.
28. See Plumb, supra note 20, at 370 & n.8.
29. See Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399, 402 (2d Cir. 1957), aff'd, 262 F.2d 512 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1002 (1957).
30. See H. Henn, Corporations § 163 (2d ed. 1970); Stone, supra note 21, at 253.
31. This factor involves comparing the respective amounts of the corporation's capital raised
by the issuance of stock and debt instruments to arrive at a "debt-equity ratio." This ratio
received great attention following the case of John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521
(1946), which indicated in dictum that in "situations [where there are only] nominal stock
investments and an obviously excessive debt structure," debt classification might be precluded for
a portion of the purported debt securities. Id. at 526.
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purported debt instruments.3 2 Congress in the Tax Reform Act of 196911
authorized the Secretary of the Treasury (or his delegate, the Internal Reve-
nue Service) to formulate regulations to be used in determining whether a
given interest is stock or indebtedness for all income tax purposes. 34
The same factors found decisive in the interest deduction context have also
been controlling in those cases which have considered whether the with-
drawable shares of a savings and loan association are debt or equity. The
three courts which have decided this question prior to the Home case
"uniformly held that the interest of withdrawable shareholders ... [qualified]
as stock. ' '35 However, Everett v. United States36 and West Side Federal
Savings & Loan Association v. United States,37 two of the cases which so
held, concerned mergers of stock-issuing state savings and loan associations
into federal associations. Unlike a state savings and loan association which
issues guarantee stock along with its withdrawable shares, a federal associa-
tion issues only withdrawable shares. 38 The proprietary interest in federal
associations must therefore be attributed to its withdrawable shares. 39 As a
result, the courts in Everett and West Side held that the withdrawable shares
there had sufficient equity characteristics to enable the transactions to meet
the continuity of interest test.
These cases differ from the Home case in other respects as well. In the
Everett case, for example, the taxpayers were seeking Type C40 reorganiza-
tion treatment. To decide whether the merger in this case met the code
32. 4A J. Mertens, Federal Income Taxation §§ 26.10a, .10c (rev. ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited
by volume as Mertens]. Thirty-two factors bearing on the debt-equity issue are discussed In
Plumb, supra note 20, at 411-555.
33. Act of Dec. 30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, tit. 4, § 415(a), 83 Stat. 613 (codified at Int.
Rev. Code of 1954, § 385).
34. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 385(b) suggests several factors for consideration, but the list is
neither all-inclusive nor binding on the Treasury Department. S. Rep. No. 91-552, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 138-39 (1969). These regulations, when issued, should specify the weight to be assigned
to the various factors and thereby establish an authoritative standard for deciding this question.
See New York State Bar Association Tax Section, Committee on Reorganization Problems,
Recommendations as to Federal Tax Distinction Between Corporate Stock and Indebtedness, 25
Tax Law. 57 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Bar Ass'n], which sets forth a suggested pattern for these
regulations.
35. 3 Mertens, supra note 32, § 20.67 (Supp. 1975).
36. 448 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1971).
37. 494 F.2d 404 (6th Cir. 1974).
38. Federal associations are prohibited by statute from issuing stock. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(b)(2)
(Supp. 1, 1975).
39. "Assuming that there must exist in all associations a proprietary interest, such broad and
uniform interest [as a depositor's share] may well serve that purpose." Home Say. & Loan Ass'n
v. United States, 514 F.2d 1199, 1208 (9th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3150
(U.S. Sept. 23, 1975) (No. 75-396); cf. Wisconsin Bankers Ass'n v. Robertson, 190 F, Supp. 90
(D.D.C. 1960), aff'd, 294 F.2d 714 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 938 (1961).
40. See note 9 supra. For a transaction to qualify as a Type C reorganization, there must be
"the acquisition by [the transferee], in exchange solely for all or a part of its voting stock ... of
substantially all of the properties of another corporation .... " Int. Rev. Code of 1954,
§ 368(a)(1)(C).
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requirements, no consideration of the withdrawable shares of the transferor, a
stock-issuing association, was necessary. The court only had to decide
whether the hybrid shares of the transferee federal association were
sufficiently equitable to be considered "voting stock." For the purposes of the
judicially created continuity of interest test which must be met in all reorgani-
zation cases, 41 the Everett court apparently assumed, without discussion, that
the transferor's savings and full paid shares also represented a proprietary
interest. More extensive rights are generally accorded withdrawable share-
holders under Kansas law which applied in Everett.42 In contrast with the
California law applicable in Home, Kansas law does not expressly authorize
an association to grant the guarantee stockholders control of the board of
directors. The question is left for the by-laws of the individual association. 43
Furthermore, the applicable Kansas statute describes the capital of an associ-
ation as being divided into shares which may be issued under various plans
and states that capital may be raised in the form of "savings deposits."44
In West Side, both the guarantee stockholders and the withdrawable
shareholders of the state association received the all-purpose federal shares.
No cash was paid for any interest in, or property of, the transferor.4 5 Thus all
possible former owners of the transferor received a proprietary interest in the
transferee.46
The 1963 case of Home Savings & Loan Association v. United States47 was
concerned with the merger of two stock-issuing associations. The conclusion
there that withdrawable shares were equity was based solely on the limited
voting rights accorded to shareholders to elect minority members to the
association's board of directors, 48 and to prevent by a two-thirds vote a
proposed merger.49 However, there was no discussion of any other factor,
despite the fact that the Supreme Court has pointed out that "(tihere is no one
characteristic . . . which can be said to be decisive in the determination of
whether... obligations are risk investments in the corporations or debts.150
41. See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (1960).
42. In Home, the government argued this point in distinguishing Everett. 514 F.2d at 1208.
43. Kan. Stat. An. §§ 17-5304 to -5305 (1974).
44. Id. § 17-5401. Under California law applicable in Home, only the proceeds from the sale
of guarantee stock are included in the fixed capital of an association. See Cal. Fin. Code § 6456.1
(West Supp. 1975); id. § 8500 (West 1968).
45. West Side Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 494 F.2d 404 (6th Cir. 1974).
46. It should be noted that the holding of the West Side case rejected the position set forth in
Rev. Rul. 6, 1969-1 Cum. Bull. 104, which held that the equity characteristics of federal
association shares were insignificant in comparison to their function as evidence of deposits.
47. 223 F. Supp. 134 (S.D. Cal. 1963).
48. As authorized by statute, the articles of incorporation or by-laws of the transferor
provided that a majority of the board of directors would be elected by the guarantee stockholders.
Id. at 135; see Cal. Fin. Code § 7651 (West 1968).
49. Cal. Fin. Code § 9200 (West Supp. 1975); see note 3 supra. The lower court in the present
Home case also stressed the power of the withdrawable shareholders to prevent the occurrence of
the merger. 73-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9609, at 81,961.
50. John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521, 530 (1946). A subsequent court,
implying that the earlier Home case was wrongly decided, remarked that the "reason for the
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The Ninth Circuit in Home held that the withdrawable shareholders of
both the transferor and transferee associations were creditors rather than
stockholders. While noting that shares possess some equity-like features-
"[t]he absence of a fixed rate of return [and] limited voting rights" 51'-the
court decided not to weigh such features heavily since there was outstanding
guarantee stock, which was "the true equity interest of these associations. "52
Thus the court did not consider the possibility that both the guarantee stock
and the withdrawable shares could be equity interests. In the court's view, the
mere presence of the guarantee stock precluded the classification of with-
drawable shares as a proprietary interest.5 3
Having concluded that the withdrawable shares were debt, the court then
dismissed the importance of their equitable characteristics. The court first
discounted the importance of the withdrawable shareholders' voting rights by
observing that California law also allows creditors of a corporation to be
granted such rights.5 4 Courts have often justified a grant of voting powers
which stops short of giving control of corporate affairs to creditors.55 More
importantly, Pasadena's withdrawable shareholders were limited by the as-
sociation's articles of incorporation to electing only a minority of the board of
directors.5 6 The guarantee stockholders controlled the board, and thus, the
association. Since even full voting rights are seldom decisive of the debt-
equity question, 57 such limited voting rights"8 may be viewed as a limited
right of depositors to protect their investment, rather than a form of corporate
control. 59
Government's failure to pursue an appeal therein has not been disclosed." Estate of Heinz
Schmidt, 42 T.C. 1130, 1136 n.7 (1964), rev'd, 355 F.2d III (9th Cir. 1966).
51. 514 F.2d at 1206. In holding the withdrawable shares to be equity, the lower court found
these characteristics to be persuasive. The court there compared withdrawable shares with
preferred stocks which are nonvoting and which yield a relatively fixed rate of return, yet which
can qualify as equity for continuity of interest purposes. 73-2 U.S. Tax Cas. T 9609, at 81,960-62.
52. 514 F.2d at 1206.
53. There appears to be no basis for the court's conclusion here. The corporate structure
typically includes several layers of equity interests, with some securities such as common stock
possessing more equity characteristics than others such as preferred stock. See generally H. Henn,
Corporations § 160 (2d ed. 1970). In addition, earlier courts have held withdrawable shares to be
equity in the context of savings and loan associations which issue guarantee stock. See notes 35-50
supra and accompanying text. It is submitted that the presence of guarantee stock should not be
dispositive of the issue of classifying withdrawable shares, but should only be one of the factors
considered.
54. Cal. Corp. Code § 306 (West 1955).
55. See Commissioner v. Union Mut. Ins. Co., 386 F.2d 974 (1st Cir. 1967); Commissioner v.
Johnson, 267 F.2d 382, 384-85 (1st Cir. 1959).
56. 514 F.2d at 1202 & n.6.
57. Jordan Co. v. Allen, 85 F. Supp. 437, 443 (M.D. Ga. 1949); W.H. Truschel, 29 T.C. 433,
439 (1957).
58. At the time of the merger in Home, California law required consent of two-thirds of the
withdrawable shareholders for such a merger. This voting right was later eliminated. See note 3
supra and accompanying text.
59. "ITIhe power of purported creditors to vote on particular matters affecting their interests,
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The absence of a statutory guarantee of a fixed rate of interest on with-
drawable shares led the court in Home to point out that a relatively steady
rate of return was ensured in practice through competition with commercial
banks. 60 California law clearly contemplates that interest is to be paid to
withdrawable shareholders subject only to the approval of the savings and
loan commissioner, whose role is to insure that rates are not kept unfairly
low. 6I The right to a return is not dependent on the discretion of the board of
directors. They may change the rates, but they are not empowered to suspend
interest payments. 62 Even when, as is not the case here, "payment of interest
[as in the typical income bonds] is conditional upon corporate earnings but
requires no discretionary action, the debt will normally be recognized. '63
Furthermore, there was no indication that interest payments were not regu-
larly made by Pasadena. A history of regular interest payments made out of
corporate earnings is one indication that a debtor-creditor relationship ex-
ists. 6
4
A factor mentioned by the lower court in Home as significant in its holding
that the withdrawable shares were an equitable interest was that Pasadena's
shareholders supplied almost 90% of the association's assets and "thereby
enabled [it] to operate .... 1,6s This argument is a variation of the debt-
such as mergers... is not inconsistent with indebtedness." Plumb, supra note 20, at 448-49; cf.
Baker Commodities, Inc. v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 374, 399-400 (1967), afld, 415 F2d 519 (9th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 988 (1970).
60. 514 F.2d at 1206. Implicit in the Home case was the court's belief that there was an
unconditional commitment to pay interest. This would suggest that there existed an equally
unconditional obligation to repay the principal. Thus, two important criteria for debt classifica-
tion would seem to be fulfilled. See text accompanying note 29 supra. This indication is further
strengthened by the California statute which provides that shareholders may withdraw their
deposits upon six months' notice. Cal. Fin. Code § 8100 (West 1968).
61. "The rates of return on shares. . . shall be determined by the board of directors of the
association [periodically] subject to the approval of the [state savings and loan] commis-
sioner ... ." Cal. Fin. Code § 7400 (West 1968). "The commissioner shall approve the rates of return
on shares.., unless be finds them unfair, unjust, or inequitable, having due regard to the earnings of
the assocaion .... " Id. § 7401.
62. See id. § 7400.
63. Plumb, supra note 20, at 432; see Lansing Community Hotel Corp. v. Commissioner, 14
T.C. 183, 189-90 (1950), aff'd, 187 F.2d 487 (6th Cir. 1951) (per curiam). See also Bar Ass'n,
supra note 34, at 69 (suggested regulation § 1.385-3(aX4)) which would accord a stock dassifica-
tion when there is "no specified interest rate;" but such classification would not be compelled if
"the payment of what is the functional equivalent of interest" is required. Id.
64. Baker Commodities, Inc. v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 374, 397-98, aff'd, 415 F.2d 519 (9th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 988 (1970); see Piedmont Corp. v. Commissioner, 388 F.2d 886
(4th Cir. 1968); Commissioner v. Union Mut. Ins. Co., 386 F.2d 974, 977 (1st Cir. 1967); cf.
Liflans Corp. v. United States, 390 F.2d 965 (Ct. Cl. 1968). There, despite a high debt-equity
ratio, the grant of an extension by the creditor on repayment of the principal, and the waiver of
some interest payments, debt classification was upheld. The court, taking into account the nature
of the enterprise, found that the issuance of debt was a sound business practice. Repayment. it
was held, was not intended to be dependent on the success of the enterprise.
65. Home Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 73-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9609 at 81,961 (C.D.
Cal. 1973), rev'd, 514 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3150 (U.S.
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equity ratio concept. It is believed that a corporation must recognize that
a certain percentage of its assets has been irrevocably committed to the
business and that the corporation cannot realistically guarantee the return of
these funds to the investor. 6 6 Classification of the withdrawable shares in both
associations as debt securities would fix Pasadena's debt-equity ratio at almost
nine to one, and while the market value of Home's 672 shares of guarantee
stock was not set forth in either opinion, 67 its ratio could be considerably
higher, since it had issued more than two and a quarter million withdrawable
shares. 68 In the ordinary situation such thin capitalization precludes debt
classification. 69
Although this issue was not addressed by the Ninth Circuit in Home, a high
debt-equity ratio in the context of a savings and loan association may not be
fatal to debt classification. The courts have varied widely as to what ratio is
unreasonably high70 but an important consideration in this context is the
corporation's type of business. It may be appropriate in most cases to hold
that assets paid into a corporation should be viewed as an equity interest if
they are essential to the corporation's business in the sense that the corpora-
tion "could not have been carried on without them. ' 71 However, most
corporations need these funds for permanent capital investment in plant,
equipment, inventory, etc. In the case of the savings and loan association,
such funds are not in the same sense committed to the enterprise. It has been
recognized that "[s]tandard ratio patterns . . . cannot well be applied to
finance companies . . ."72 since there, as is true of the savings and loan
industry, "the very business . . . is the borrowing of funds at one interest rate
and lending them at a higher rate."'73 The fact that in the finance industry
Sept. 23, 1975) (No. 75-396). This figure was arrived at by comparing the sale price of Pasadena's
guarantee stock, over eight million dollars, with the deposits represented by its withdrawable
shares, more than sixty-five million dollars. See notes I and 2 supra and accompanying text.
66. Schnitzer v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 43, 62 (1949), aff'd, 183 F.2d 70 (9th Cir. 1950) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 911 (1951).
67. At the time of the merger California law provided that "[gluarantee stock shall have a par
value of not less than ten dollars ($10) per share," but the present version of the statute has
eliminated this requirement. Ch. 364, § 6456, [1951] Cal. Stats. 1000, as amended Cal. Fin. Code
§ 6456 (West 1968).
68. Cal. Fin. Code § 6500 (West 1968) prvides that "[w]ithdrawable shares shall be of the
par value of one hundred ($100) or two hundred ($200) dollars each.
69. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
70. See Estate of Miller v. Commissioner, 239 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1956). See generally Caplin,
The Caloric Count of a Thin Incorporation, N.Y.U. 17th Inst. on Fed. Tax 771 (1959). For
several years after the case of John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521 (1946), a ratio of
less than four to one was considered safe for debt classification, Plumb, supra note 20, at 507-19,
but the courts have not considered this figure to be a maximum,
71. Brake & Elec. Sales Corp. v. United States, 185 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D. Mass. 1960), aff'd, 287
F.2d 426 (1st Cir. 1961) (financing of auto parts business); see Stone, supra note 21, at 256.
72. Plumb, supra note 20, at 511.
73. Security Fin. & Loan Co. v. Koehler, 210 F. Supp. 603, 605 (D. Kan. 1962). "It has
been held that the 'thin capitalization' doctrine has no application where the very business is the
profitable utilization of borrowed funds." 4A Mertens, supra note 32, § 26.10c, at 91.
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money is the corporation's "stock in trade" distorts the debt-equity ratio and
makes the usual standards inappropriate. 74
A widely accepted statement of the essential difference between stockhold-
ers and creditors is that "the stockholder's intention is to ... (take] the risks of
loss attendant upon [the corporate adventure] . . . [while] [tihe creditor . . .
does not intend to take such risks so far as they may be avoided, but merely to
lend his money to others who do intend to take them."' "- Thus, the court in
Home noted that the right of the investor to repayment in the event of the
dissolution of the corporation is a most important factor in the debt-equity
issue. 76 The court stressed that California law does not subordinate with-
drawable shareholders to the claims of creditors; 77 rather, it treats them as
creditors whose claims in liquidation must be paid before certain payments
can be made to others. 78 In contrast, guarantee stock in a savings and loan
association is expressly subordinated to creditors, including shareholders.79 A
depositor in these associations does not intend to make a high-risk investment;
his understanding is that he will receive back his deposit, 0 usually on
demand, 8' together with interest. -8 2
The court enumerated several other statutory provisions which influenced
its holding that withdrawable shares are essentially debt instruments. It noted
that the Internal Revenue Code provides that the return paid to savings and
74. Plumb, supra note 20, at 511. The New York State Bar Association suggests that an
interest be accorded debt status if it is an obligation "incurred in the ordinary course of business,
such as in consideration for inventory or supplies." Bar Ass'n, supra note 34, at 65 (suggested
regulation § 1.385(2Xb)). This provision would be applicable to withdravable shares if they are
viewed as a promise by the association to pay for the "inventor"' supplied by its depositors.
75. United States v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 133 F.2d 990. 993 (6th Cir. 1943) (emphasis
omitted).
76. 514 F.2d at 1207; see text accompanying note 30 supra.
77. 514 F.2d at 1207; see Cal. Fin. Code § 8401 (West 1968).
78. In re Pacific Coast Bldg.-Loan Ass'n, 15 Cal. 2d 134, 146-48, 99 P.2d 251, 256-57
(1940) (upon dissolution, withdrawable shareholders entitled to return of principal before interest
payments are made to holders of investment certificates). This court also pointed out the "sharp
distinction . . . between guarantee stock and membership shares" noting that '[the guarantee
stockholders take the major risk, and in return have the controlling voice in management ....
They receive all the profits over the moderate return by way of interest [paid to shareholders and
others]." Id. at 142, 99 P.2d at 254. The court in Home pointed out that shareholders are treated
"on the basis of substantial parity with respect to the payment of interest during liquidation" with
holders of investment certificates, an interest having scant equity characteristics. 514 F.2d at
1207; see Cal. Fin. Code § 9055.5 (West 1968).
79. Cal. Fin. Code § 8450 (West Supp. 1975).
80. The return of a shareholder's deposit in a state savings and loan association is guaranteed
up to $40,000 if the institution is insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corpora-
tion. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1726, 1728 (Supp. 1, 1975).
81. Although California allows the association to require six months notice before withdraw-
al, Cal. Fin. Code § 8100 (West 1968), the court in Home noted that, at least in the case of the
transferee, Home, such restrictions on withdrawal were rarely imposed. 514 F.2d at 1203.
82. See H. Russell, Savings and Loan Associations 267-305 (2d ed. 1960); cf. Affiliated Gov't
Empl. Distrib. Co. v. Commissioner, 322 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1963). cert. denied, 376 U.S. 950
(1964).
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loan association shareholders is deductible from taxable income, 83 as is
interest on indebtedness generally.8 4 This argument carries little weight,
however, since the applicable Code provisions do not classify the withdrawa-
ble shares as debt instruments, but merely provide that the return paid on the
shares, however they are classified, shall be deductible. The court further
supported its holding by pointing out that California law bars shareholders
from bringing a stockholder's derivative suit.85
The court mentioned as a "most compelling indication" that withdrawable
shares are debt the fact that the value of deposits represented by such shares
is designated by California law to be included among the liabilities of a
savings and loan association against which the value of the outstanding stock
is compared for the purpose of determining whether the capital of an
association is impaired.8 6 A similar argument for debt classification was made
by the court in pointing out that the value of an association's shares is one of
the limits imposed on the size of an association's bad debt reserve. 87 While
these statutory provisions are of practical significance in classifying with-
drawable shares, they are not usually among the factors considered in the
debt-equity issue. 88
The Ninth Circuit in Home was the first court to hold that withdrawable
shares are debt securities rather than stock for the purpose of determining
whether the statutory merger of savings and loan associations should be
accorded reorganization tax treatment. It was also the first court to point out
the difference between the all-purpose shares of a federal association which,
of necessity, are assumed to be equity,8 9 and the withdrawable shares of a
state association where the presence of stock makes such an assumption
inappropriate. The Ninth Circuit concluded without adequate analysis, how-
ever, that since the guarantee stockholders of the two associations were equity
holders, the withdrawable shareholders did not hold an equitable interest.
The court failed to give adequate consideration to the question whether
Pasadena's withdrawable shareholders may also have been equity holders of
that association.9" In addition, the court failed to analyze the problem of
Pasadena's high debt-equity ratio. 9' The Ninth Circuit's holding that Pasade-
na's withdrawable shares were debt instruments may have been correct, but its
83. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 591; see note 22 supra.
84. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 163(a).
85. 514 F.2d at 1207; see Cal. Fin. Code § 7616 (West 1968).
86. Cal. Fin. Code § 8500 (West 1968).
87. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 593(b)(1).
88. See generally Plumb, supra note 20, at 411-555.
89. See notes 35-39 supra and accompanying text.
90. It should be noted that some of the federal statutory provisions which point toward debt
classification for Pasadena's shares (e.g., the F.S.L.I.C. guarantee and limits on the size of an
association's bad debt reserves based on the value of withdrawable share deposits) apply equally
well to withdrawable shares in federal associations which uniformly have been held to be equity
instruments.
91. See text accompanying notes 65-74 supra.
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conclusion should have been based on a comparison of the relative attributes
of these shares with those of other securities issued by that association,
undertaken without an assumption that the association can possess only one
class of equity interest.
David IV. Worrell
